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Abstract
Much of the existing theories of mobilization appear to focus on either micro or macro
level elements that lead to mobilization, very few seem to focus on fusing the two; specifically
psychological dynamics with macro structural components. This dissertation seeks to synthesize
the two together to explain how psychology, specifically the perception of deprivation
exacerbated by heightened social interaction through technology has introduced a new element to
politics in the Middle East and North, which has furthered awareness of the exploitative nature of
neoliberalism and the impact that the system has on the greater Arab populace. This dissertation
explains how heightened social interaction has enabled Arab public to understand and mobilize
more easily against oppression and inequality (whether real or perceived) in an effort to bring
about change that cannot take place through institutional means. I argue that heightened social
interaction through technology serves as a catalyst for seeking change in authoritarian systems
that are facilitated by the structure of the global system.
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Introduction
In 2010, the Arab world began to experience what would be considered just one of a
series of mass violent protests that would take place over the coming years.1 What initially began
as a Tunisian man’s struggle to highlight corruption in the Tunisian bureaucracy, transformed
into a broader movement aimed at overthrowing Arab leaders throughout the region. This wave
of mobilization has since spread throughout much of the Arab world, toppling the leaders of
three Arab states and challenging the authority of many more. Because of these circumstances,
studies of Arab politics have considerably increased, as the Arab world has inadvertently
positioned itself to be at the center of contemporary discussions of public mobilization. This has
led to an emergence of numerous studies pertaining to the origins of contemporary Arab
mobilization. Much of the existing research, however, focuses either exclusively on domestic
factors or wholly on international factors, without considering the entirety of the variables in
these countries. Therefore, the findings account for only a portion of the factors responsible for
mobilization. The majority of literature on mobilization fails to account for the complex,
multifaceted nature of contemporary Arab uprisings that stem from both internal and external
dynamics. This study attempts to provide a broader illustration of the roots and implications of
contemporary Arab mobilization by using a multilevel approach that synthesizes the foundations
of paradigms derived from both the comparative and International relations fields of political
science. It relies on a fusion of macro and micro level dynamics of mobilization, which as a
combination, appears to have been overlooked in much of the existing literature. The theory
borrows from neo-Marxist based approaches because it regards Arab mobilization as a response
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1
This dissertation focuses on Arab states. These states are predominately inhabited by Arabs
!who are Semitic people, speak Arabic, and subscribe to the Islamic worldview.
!
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to domestic circumstances brought about by macro-economic conditions that are externally
driven.
A vast amount of the unrest currently taking place in the Arab world can be attributed to
the structure of the global system, the economic role the region plays in the larger system, and
the social and political circumstances that result from that economic role. Arab states are plagued
with underperformance as a result of colonialism, persistent wars, civil violence and heightened
competition between superpowers. 2They are rentier-based economies that lack the capacity to
diversify and become globally competitive. Most Arab economies are largely based on the export
of raw materials and the location of strategic trade routes, such as the Suez Canal and the
Straight of Hormuz, make the Middle East and North Africa of particular importance to the
global economy. States that have little to export, however, are often interest to global powers for
their geo-strategic significance. Because of this, much of the Arab world is caught within the
web of a global economic hierarchy that sustains the political and social apparatus of Arab states.
Arab leaders have little incentive to respond to domestic demands because of the security that oil
rents provide to them. International reliance on oil prevents and largely dissuades any foreign
interference that could potentially hamper the production and delivery of the valuable
commodity. Western political and economic interests in the region have led to the peripheral role
that Arab states have taken globally; the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world
can therefore be partially attributed to Western interests in the region and the West’s desire to
safeguard its political and economic interests.
The Arab world is plagued with patrimonial autocracies. For this reason there is a great
deal of dysfunction in what little institutional apparatus that does exist within Arab states. Arab
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
Kenneth M. Pollack, The Arab Awakening :America and the Transformation of the Middle
East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2011)67.
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leaders maintain absolute control by allowing only friends and family within the decisionmaking apparatus. Nepotism and cronyism prevent qualified individuals from gaining access to
political power and therefore prevent meaningful change. The tribal characteristics of Arab
culture can be found throughout most aspects of the Arab state. Because of the security that Arab
leaders are afforded through oil rents, Arab nations largely remain in a patrimonial state. Arab
leaders are known to use state resources to buy loyalty and then use oppression as a tool to
preserve the corrupt patron-client centered relationship that the state is structured around. Oil
rents and profits from state resources are used as a tool for buying regime support rather than
being utilized for building much-needed state infrastructure. This often leads to a hierarchal
social structure consisting of a small regime-affiliated upper class, and a large lower class with
limited upward mobility.
Arab states are unable to meet the social, political and economic needs of their
populations because of the misallocation of state funds. State funds are often used for the
personal pleasure of those affiliated with the regime rather than the needs of society. Leaders
therefore respond by oppressing the population. This tactic appears to be designed to instill fear
and prevent activism among citizens. The Arab world’s internal and external problems, as a
result of the social, political and economic factors mentioned earlier, are what largely contribute
to its role in the global system. Awareness, spurred along by the use of social media among the
Arab people, appears to be leading to anti-systemic mass mobilization. This mobilization is
geared largely towards overthrowing the dictatorial leaders that maintain the Arab world’s role in
the global system. The anti-imperialist rhetoric that was once largely associated with the antiimperialist revolutions in Algeria and Iran, is now common throughout much of the Arab world.
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It is now apparent that the Western world selects which Arab states are friend and which
are foe, purely on short-term political and economic interests. The United States and much of the
Western world largely ignore human rights violations in Saudi Arabia and other conservative
Arab regimes because of the interests of elites in both the Eastern and Western worlds. The
policies pursued as a result of these interests therefore help maintain oppression.
A vast amount of the literature on the roots of this phenomenon appears to be focused on
the elements of repression and economic instability, rather than deeper psychological dynamics
as potential triggers for mobilization. This is perhaps because scholars have faced difficulty in
terms of connecting the authoritarian nature of a given regime with the behavior of its populace.
While the political authority’s conduct has indeed played a significant role in contemporary case
studies of Arab mobilization, existing studies have failed to illustrate how anger towards the
regime is converted on a psychological level to mobilization.
Most theories of this phenomenon are focused on the internal features of the state, such as
the ideology and configuration of the regime, as the central trigger for uprising. While this may
be appropriate for micro level studies of the Arab Spring, it omits the external elements that
framed the current structure of the Middle East. Although some scholars have tried to attribute
the uprising to religious or cultural features, there is little evidence to indicate that values
(religious or cultural) are responsible for the oppressive approach that Arab leaders have
adopted. Authoritarianism in the Arab world stems from a series of issues that must be studied
on multiple levels. To construct a comprehensive explanation of the uprisings in the Arab world,
scholars must focus on building a link between the internal and external factors that have
inspired mass anti-systemic mobilization in the region.
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Prior to the widespread emergence of text messaging and social media, scholars were
largely unable to build theoretical bridges that could properly illustrate mass reaction to a given
regime. Today, however, there is a vast amount of qualitative and quantitative data on social
media use in the Arab world that enables us to study how the global political atmosphere impacts
societal behavior. While it is evident that domestic institutional dynamics have greatly
contributed to the ongoing conflict in the region, much of the literature appears to overlook the
anti-imperialist nature of the ongoing uprisings by largely centering on the authoritarian structure
of the regimes themselves. For the Arab people, the state is often perceived as an extension of
Western control and a tool for maintaining the status quo. Therefore, the uprisings, while
centered on overthrowing domestic dictators, are largely anti-imperialist and anti-systemic in
nature.
Although there has been a significant increase in literature pertaining to Arab politics,
much of it has lacked a thorough conceptual and theoretical account of contemporary Arab
mobilization. Most of the existing studies focus on constructing narratives rather than providing
an accurate background of Arab discontent that could be used to build a theoretical framework
for mobilization. In addition, much of the literature appears to use the term revolution to describe
events that lack the transformative characteristics of genuine revolutions. Much of these
conceptual flaws can be attributed to discussing mass political behavior outside of a proper
framework. In order to construct a proper theoretical explanation for what is taking place in the
Arab world, it is critical to begin by discussing mobilization within a context of political change.
The first chapter of this dissertation familiarizes the reader with existing theories of
public mobilization by discussing concepts, theories and methods employed in the broader
literature on social mobilization. It will begin by defining public mobilization and social change
!
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and a brief comparison of mass political protests and revolutions to further distinguish the
dynamics that differentiate them. This chapter will also discuss the leading theories of public
mobilization and the limitations they have when attempting to explain mobilization from both a
comparative and International Relations perspective. It will include a discussion on the
foundations of classical works on anti-systemic mobilization by reviewing the central
components of Marx’s literature on revolution. The chapter will then move on to discuss the
emergence of some of the more contemporary theories of anti-systemic mobilization that are
relevant to studies of the Arab uprisings. These include World Systems Theory and FrustrationAggression/Relative Deprivation. The remainder of chapter one will consist of a brief outline of
the methodological approach used for this study. It will discuss the challenges of studying
developing nations and why a qualitative approach is generally employed for studies of the Arab
world.
Chapter two explains the internal foundations of Arab mobilization by discussing
domestic historical factors that have enabled the global system to keep the Arab world in a
dependent role. This chapter will explain the sudden rise of public mobilization by discussing the
social, political and economic complications brought about by this dependent relationship. It will
also discuss how internal factors such as the lack of institutions, lack of state services, and the
authoritarian nature of the political authority foster internal opposition, result in state sponsored
oppression. Additionally, it will investigate the role of social media in the mobilization process
and how heightened social interaction, as a result of new forms of communication, is providing
Arabs with an outlet for voicing their grievances with the state. It is also a tool that enables them
to rapidly organize anti-systemic anti-imperialist movements.
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Chapter three focuses on external dynamics, specifically how imperialist/ neo-colonialist
policies aid in maintaining the Arab world’s dependent role in the global system. This chapter
illustrates the impact that economic dependency, resulting from global imperialist/neo-colonialist
policies, has on development in the Arab world. This chapter largely focuses on the exploitative
nature of global institutions such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization and
International Monetary Fund and how these institutions maintain the neoliberal agenda that
American imperialism is founded upon.
Chapter four contains an explanation of the impact that the uprisings are having in these
states by examining the social, political and economic consequences of the Arab Spring. This
chapter is largely centered on discussing the domestic changes that have taken place as result of
what is happening in these states and what these changes can lead to in terms of political
freedom, safety and wellbeing of the citizens. It will also discuss the role that Islamist groups
have on mobilizing regime opposition, why they have such a strong presence, and how their rise
to power has largely impeded true revolutionary change. The chapter will also examine the
political-structural changes that have emerged as a result of these uprisings and how they have
altered the state and institutions. Chapter four will also examine the Arab uprisings from a
regional perspective by discussing what can be interpreted as the advent of an unconventional
proxy style war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It also examines how contemporary mobilization
has brought attention to the ideological conflict that exists in the Middle East and how it has
altered the political dynamics of the wider region by largely highlighting elements of the SunniShi’a divide. The chapter will explain what the Arab uprisings mean for the region and why Arab
leaders will have to become more responsive to the needs of the populace if they intend to stay in
power. It will include a discussion about Islamists and how they will shape the political
!
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atmosphere if they remain in power. The chapter will conclude with what the rise of Islamist
groups will mean for minorities that continue to live in the region.
Chapter four will conclude with an explanation of the challenges of managing instability
and why the United States will have to reevaluate its approach to the region. It will discuss the
political ramifications of supporting Arab autocracies and the potential costs of a more
autonomous Middle East. Also, will also touch over the economic and political implications of
mass migration as a result of instability, particulary in regards to Syria and the nations that are
receiving them. It will also touch on the role of China, its shift towards being the largest
importer of oil, and what this will mean for future relations with China. It will also discuss the
role of Russia and its growing influence on this region.

!
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Chapter One
Mass Political Mobilization: A Framework for Analysis

Conceptualization
The term popular/mass-mobilization refers to the practice of rallying/organizing the
public for a particular purpose or in response to a specific phenomenon that is often associated
with some form of contention. It is a phenomenon that has exceedingly high levels of public
involvement.3 The occurrence is marked by a visible increase in participation that is centered on
bringing attention to various dynamics that may not be gaining sufficient attention. The process
is characterized by increased social interaction, group formation, and heightened public
involvement that is often geared around challenging or bringing attention to existing social,
economic, or political factors.4 Robert S. Jansen describes it as “ …a political means that can be
undertaken by challengers and incumbents of various stripes in pursuit of wide socio-political
and economic agendas”. 5 Mass mobilization is a prerequisite, a step that occurs prior to any
social movements or revolution, it is a necessary step required of any successful bottom-up,
populace-based transformation.
Mass mobilization can take on a variety of different characteristics; it does not look
identical in every case study. In some circumstances the process of mobilization may be less
noticeable, in others it may be impossible to overlook. One very notable example of popular
mobilization is the Civil Rights Movement that occurred in the United States in the 1960s. The
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
Public mobilization, mass mobilization and popular mobilization are used interchangeably
to refer to mobilization on behalf of the populace.
4
Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub.
Co., 1978)69.
5
Robert S. Jansen, "Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism*,"
Sociological Theory 29, no. 2 (2011)78.
!
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Civil Rights Movement included extensive amounts of communication and organization of large
segments of the American population. The emergence of groups such as the NAACP,
conferences, protests and sit-ins were used to bring government attention to the society’s
growing support for eradicating racial discrimination. The Civil Rights Movement highlighted
not only the cultural divide that existed in 1960’s United States, but also rising support for
eliminating the institutional roots of race-based discrimination in the United States. It was
remarkably visible because organizers utilized the presence of intense confrontations between
protestors and authorities to produce more support for civil rights.
Mobilization is a component of the revolutionary process. Its presence, however, does not
equate to revolution or revolutionary transformation. Revolutions are often confused with other
violent transformative events such as coups, rebellions and civil wars because of the overlapping
characteristics that these movements share. 6While civil wars, coup d’états and rebellions can
indeed alter the political structure of a state, they tend to be different because they do not fully
alter both the state and social structure. Revolutions transform the social, economic and political
orientation of the state and its citizenry through popular mobilization and, therefore, tend to be
far longer in duration. Given the vast change that occurs during the revolutionary process, it is
safe to agree that revolutions are rather lengthy; they simply cannot transpire within a short span
of time. They ensue as a result of years of dissatisfaction that eventually results in mass antisystemic mobilization and ultimately regime consolidation.7

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6
Al S. Cohan, Theories of Revolution :An Introduction (London: Nelson, 1975), [10], 228.;
James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 3rd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 2007), 440.; John Foran, Theorizing Revolutions (London; New York: Routledge, 1997),
300.
7
James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review 27, no.
1 (Feb., 1962): 5-19.
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Unlike coups, which are events that result in the transformation of the authority of a state,
revolutions cannot be reduced to just institutional change. They are comprised of numerous
processes that occur simultaneously throughout the state.

Political transformation
Revolutions alter the composition and the ideological underpinnings of political
authority. Revolutionary movements are centered on overthrowing the existing regime, and
supplanting the political, ideological, and institutional structure. This type of transformation is
found in all successful revolutions that have occurred throughout history.
The French Revolution of 1789 transformed the state by introducing a constitution that
set forth the creation of a parliamentary system that was largely centered on a sense of liberty
equaty and fraternity. It abolished the monarchy that, while technically not absolute in nature,
enabled the king to maintain much of the decision making power. 8 The Russian revolution that
began in 1905 transformed a Tsarist-led autocratic state to a parliamentary system that would
later be dominated by a party consisting of working class segments of Russian society, known as
the Bolsheviks.9 China’s revolution largely occurred in phases spanning from the 1911 to 1949.10
While the early phases of the revolution introduced a new constitution and replaced the emperor
with a president, it was not until 1959 that communism replaced the philosophical foundation of
the new political system. The 1905 Iranian revolution ushered in a new constitution that called
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
While the complex bureaucratic structure of the French state indicated a division of power,
eighteenth century France was mostly governed by kings that declared themselves to be absolute
monarchs. Stephen K. Sanderson, Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political
Contention, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010)19.
9
Jaroslav Krejc´i and Anna Krejcová, Great Revolutions Compared :The Outline of a
Theory, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1994)11.
10
Sanderson, Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political Contention,
277.
!
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for a parliamentary system while maintaining the monarchic structure of the state. The 1979
revolution, however, almost entirely transformed the structure and the underlying ideology of the
state. It replaced the Iranian monarch with a leader of the Shi’a religious establishment, thereby
intertwining elements of the Shi’a religious establishment with the state itself. 11
While there are more examples of state transformation through revolution, the ones
mentioned above provide a brief illustration of the kind of alteration that generally takes place
within the political authority. The examples cited indicate the presence of a clear compositional
shift within the leadership apparatus. In each case monarchs, tsars, emperors etc. were replaced
with leaders that were completely different, in terms of their underlying ideology, from the
preceding leadership. There were also exceedingly clear alterations in the ideals on which the
states were founded, as visible largely through the configuration of the newly formed states.12

Economic transformation
Economic transformation is the process in which existing economic principles and
practices are replaced by ideals that are more aligned with new revolutionary precepts. This can
entail a shift from a particular type of economic system such as capitalism, to a more redistributive type structure like socialism or communism. The process can entirely remodel the
economic system, or it can simply result in less extreme alterations like instilling mechanisms for
revenue that may have been lacking during the previous regime.
France experienced a huge economic transformation as a result of its first revolution. The
nation had a series of economic problems resulting mostly from extensive population growth and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1982), 561.
12
In each of the case studies we witness the emergence of constitutional systems.
!
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oppressive taxation policies in the early 1700s that caused extensive amounts of economic
hardship. The nation’s agricultural infrastructure was ill equipped to sustain the rapid population
growth that it was encountering at the time, which therefore resulted in a scarcity of food
products and excessively high food prices. In addition, the political authority imposed taxes
unequally, collecting them rather oppressively by concentrating on the peasantry.13 Nobility and
clergy however were exempt from paying taxes and, prior to the revolution, owned nearly one
third of the nation’s land. 14 While the revolution was no-doubt multidimensional, much of the
mobilization took place with the prospects of transforming the dire economic conditions that had
afflicted the nation as a result of oppressive policies by the political authority. Heightened
economic inequality was undoubtedly a critical determinant for mass mobilization that ultimately
resulted in revolutionary transformation. The French revolution ushered in structural economic
transformations by eliminating feudal dues and mandatory church tithes, nationalizing church
lands, and abolishing taxes on farming. While the success of the economic reforms that came
about as a result of the revolution is debatable15, economic policies were indeed transformed
greatly.
As with all case studies of nations that have encountered revolution, economic inequality
was prevalent in Russia, and in the 1800’s that gap between the rich and the poor was
progressively widening. Nearly half of Russian peasants were serfs that were bound by the
unpredictable authoritative policies of their landlords. 16The tsar laid claim not only to all of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13
Lilian Knowles, "New Light on the Economic Causes of the French Revolution," The
Economic Journal 29, no. 113 (Mar., 1919)2.
14
Stephen K. Sanderson, Revolutions a Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political
Contention (Boulder Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2010),17.
15
Some of the policies were actually worse off for tenants
16
Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf,
1995) 4.
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land and natural resources of the country but the people who worked for him. 17 Although Tsar
Alexender theoretically eradicated serfdom in 1861, Russian peasants continued to experience
vast amounts of economic inequality as result of the terms of their freedom. As part of their
emancipation, landless peasants were to pay the state for their freedom through rather extended
mortgages that were then turned over to the previous landlords. Workers in the more urban parts
of the nation were also experiencing vast amounts of inequality through low wages and
extremely poor working conditions.18 In addition, Russia’s involvement in WWII led to
extremely high food prices that were in fact so high that even Russian farmers were struggling to
feed themselves.
Much like France and Russia, Iran also went through a period of economic inequality
prior to its 1979 revolution. The Shah and those affiliated with the regime owned substantial land
thus the system was essentially clientelistic and characterized by nepotism. Although
Mohammad Reza Shah implemented various economic policies in an effort to build a stronger
base among the Iranian masses, however, his efforts were viewed largely as failures. Land
reform policies that were intended to strengthen ties and build support for the regime resulted in
even greater discontent on behalf of the peasantry. 19 High rates of unemployment (particularly
among those with college degrees) paired with high food and living costs, and an ever-growing
gap between the rich and poor, contributed greatly to the citizenry’s decision to mobilize. The
emergence of shantytowns was indicative of the extremely high cost of living that Iranians were

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17
Sanderson, Revolutions: A Worldwide Introduction to Social and Political Contention 32
18
Prior the revolutions, work weeks were 6 days in length and typical works shifts were
over 10 hours in duration.
19
The White revolution was a series of reform enacted by the Shah. Land reform was one
of the changes that were implemented as part of the top down approach. Peasants were given the
opportunity to buy land by obtaining loans from the government
!
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confronted with and the living conditions, which the peasantry was willing to endure to leave the
agrarian lifestyle. 20
The cases cited above indicate that revolutions are not simply focused on transforming
political authority; they are also centered on improving economic conditions. While it is
debatable as to whether economic conditions truly improve through revolution 21, the motivation
for mobilization is indeed partially rooted in the troubles instigated by desires for economic
reform.

Social transformation
Unlike first-order or adaptive changes, transformative social changes result in visible
alterations to societal composition. In contrast to adaptive social changes, transformative social
change results in a more rapid alteration to the political values and traditions of a given society.22
Revolutionaries seek to change the existing social composition by introducing philosophies
founded on resistance to the status quo and the clientelistic nature of the Ancien Regimes. After
revolution, society’s social structure is altered to reflect new values and renewed social hierarchy
that coincides with the ideals of the new political authority.
The extent to which society transforms as a result of revolution greatly differs from state
to state. In some cases, states experience considerable social-cultural changes, while others
experience alterations that are more structural in nature. These changes while obviously different
in terms of degree are considerably important features in the process of revolutionary
transformation. The French revolution transformed the structure of French society by introducing
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a democratic form of government that reallocated power and wealth among the French citizenry
by diffusing privileges that were once reserved for nobility. French society undoubtedly changed
not only in terms of its class composition but also in the ideals that guided every day life. 23
Although the social changes that occurred as a result of the Russian revolutions were less
prevalent than those that occurred in France much of the power shifted in to the hands of the
working class. The Iranian revolution of 1979 also resulted in a series of transformative social
changes. The revolution caused a flood of policies that resulted in the implementation of laws
pertaining to marriage, reproduction, divorce, clothing, political participation, and education.24
The purpose of this dissertation is to offer a theoretical framework that integrates two
levels of analysis to illustrate why the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing a precipitous
surge in anti-systemic mass mobilization. Popular anti-systemic mobilization is the key focus of
this dissertation because it is central to understanding the Arab Spring.

Methodology
Studies of Arab politics are inclined to be rather qualitative in nature. The absence of
solid quantitative research on the Middle East and North Africa is mostly due to the political
realities of the region. Political circumstances, namely the volatile environments in which these
nations reside have resulted in a deficiency in statistical data used to conduct quant-based
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distribution of power within the community: Classes, Stande, Parties,” Journal of classic
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Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
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Kamrava, Revolution in Iran :The Roots of Turmoil (London; New York: Routledge, 1990),
174.; Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Politics in Iran : Shiʻism from Quietism to Revolution (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 258.; George Lenczowski, Iran Under the Pahlavis
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studies. Voids in data in the Middle East and North Africa are attributed to a series of different
issues; however, one of the central reasons for this is the informal landscape in which politics is
carried out. Much of the institutional apparatus necessary for conducting and maintaining
statistical data is either absent, underfunded or simply incapable of functioning as a result of
political circumstances within those countries. Scholars generally find that preforming field
research within the Middle East and North Africa is extremely challenging because of the
difficulty associated with attaining primary sources. This is particularly true in regards to
information that could be used for analyzing political conditions. The authoritarian nature of
Arab states appears to be the greatest deterrent to conducting field research in Arab countries. 25
Authoritarian regimes tend to be sensitive to data collection, therefore it is common for archival
materials pertaining to politics to either disappear or be intentionally destroyed by officials
associated with the regime. 26 Also, it is common for such information to be in the hands of
private individuals simply unwilling to share it with the public. 27 Furthermore, the informal
nature of politics in these societies does not lend to research focused on institutions and formal
politics.
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Janine Clark’s study indicates the issues that researchers face when conducting research in
the Middle East: "When question as to the greatest difficulties encountered in the field,
respondents overwhelmingly reported issues that directly or indirectly were a result of the
authoritarian political climate. While researchers experiences varied widely, 45% of the
respondents noted what one researcher probably speaking called “the looming smell of
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Because of theoretical foundation and the constraints associated with obtaining statistical
data, the bulk of this dissertation is qualitative in nature. In other words, quantitative data is not
used unless it truly has a role in either proving or disproving the underlying theoretical premise
of why Arabs are mobilizing. The empirical data used will be derived from sources such as: peer
reviewed journal articles, scholarly books, and newspaper articles. The literature utilized will
contain material that is centered on the historical development of Arab states, their social and
political structure, leadership style, civil society, economic development, social dynamics of the
region, and global political and economic relations within the Arab world. This literature will
serve as a tool for building the theoretical argument that revolutions are the result of a
combination of micro and macro level social, psychological, political and economic dynamics.
This dissertation focuces on the nation-state as the level of analysis, since popular
mobilization largely targets the state and its institutional and policy parameters and practices.
The states examined in this dissertation are the ones that experienced mass uprisings as part of
the “Arab Spring”. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria are, therefore, the focus of this work.
Theories of Popular Mobilization
Scholars have developed numerous theories about mass mobilization, with most of the
literature being focused on revolutions. Theories of mobilization, depending on their level of
analysis, can be found throughout various subfields of discipline. Most studies of the topic,
however, largely originate within two fields of study: International relations and comparative
politics. Such theories tend to be divided by two central themes; those that focus on macro
structural elements as the causal mechanism for mobilization and those that are centered on
micro-level, behavior related factors. The field that each theory is associated with largely
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indicates the causal mechanisms and the level of analysis utilized to explain mobilization.This
dissertation relies on a theoretical synthesis of micro and macro levels of analysis.

Micro-level theoretical frameworks
Micro level theories of mobilization began to emerge around approximately the 1960’s.
Prior to then, most theories focused on socio-economic factors that were largely derived from
Marx’s theory of revolution. Increased access to data and more sophisticated social science
methods, however, enabled scholars to delve deeper in to the psychological components that
contribute to mobilization, thereby leading to the emergence of new micro-level theoretical
approaches to studying the unique political phenomena. It was during this time that political
science scholars shifted toward approaches that made use of the psychological foundations of
human behavior to build a better understanding of popular mobilization.
Socio-psychological approaches largely consist of theoretical analogies of collective
human conduct that build upon prevailing philosophies of individualized, psychological behavior
and for this reason suffer from level of analysis issues. Theories such as these mostly view
collective human behavior as a result of micro-psychological factors, which, in this circumstance
is focused on human reaction to negative stimuli. Socio-psychological theories largely contend
that popular mobilization is collective human behavior that originates from exposure to widescale deprivation (negative stimuli). They maintain that humans respond by striking back at the
source of negative stimuli when unable to evade or overcome it. Socio-psychological theories
also contend that when part of a larger community, citizens are locked in the persistent process
of gauging where they stand, comparatively, in the socioeconomic spectrum. Individuals are,
therefore, continually in the process of gauging their overall condition, or exposure to negative
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stimuli in relation not just to others within the community but also in relation to their own past
circumstances.28 Through the course of this process, society gains insight into the source of its
deprivation through increased knowledge29, thereby mobilizing to improve conditions.30 From
this perspective, popular mobilization is a natural response to feelings of being comparatively
disadvantaged. Micro level approaches such as these introduced a new dimension to theories of
collective political mobilization by shifting the focus away from structural factors to micro-level
elements that were largely overlooked in the past.

31

James Davies was one of the first political science scholars to construct a theory of
popular mobilization that linked a socio-psychological paradigm of micro human behavior to
revolutionary transformation by creating what is often known as the Davies J-Curve. Ted Gurr
however, expanded on his approach by constructing a more comprehensive social-psychological
theory that could be applied to an even greater variety of political movements. Davies theory of
revolution integrates psychological dynamics with traditional socio-economic elements. His
theory is focused on uncovering the factors that lead specifically to revolution. From this
perspective, revolutions transpire only when socio-economic conditions make a sudden and
dramatic reversal, shaping what is referred to as an inverted J-curve.32 The general claim is that
revolutions are the result of anger, frustration and anxiety that society as a whole experiences
from a sudden decline.33 Davies attributes revolution to the population’s perspective of socio!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28
Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Published for the Center of
International Studies, Princeton University by Princeton University Press, 1970)22-25.
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This knowledge is gained through social interaction or what I refer to as heightened social
interaction resulting from social media and text messaging.
30
Ibid.
31
Deprivation is the feeling that individuals experiences when exposed to negative stimuli.
32
A J-curve is simply the shape that economic and social conditions look like when graphed
out.
33
Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution6
!

!
!

20!

economic conditions, rather than the actual state of socio-economic development.34 He
essentially claims that once society has experienced a sustained period of both social and
economic advancement, the citizenry expects advancement to persist. If social and economic
conditions, however, make a steep and sudden decline, the population feels a sense of
psychological deprivation. If that depirvation continues to spread through society and there is an
overall consensus about the presesnce of deprivation, it can utlimatly manifest into mass antisystemic mobilization. The key component to Davies’ theory is that revolutions transpire only
when society has directly experienced constant social and economic improvement, followed by a
steep, sudden and persistent decline.
Ted Gurr essentially builds upon Davies’ theory of mobilization by expanding the
general premise to address political violence. For Gurr, political violence includes any form of
violence that is aimed at challenging the monopoly of power, and destroying standard political
practices. 35 Political violence therefore includes events such as revolutions, guerilla wars, coups
d’etats, rebellions and riots. 36 Such violence occurs when society experiences deprivation
resulting from unattainable rising value expectations that emerge as a result of exposure to
modes of life that are often far different, and in many ways perceived better than their own.
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According to Gurr, exposure to such ideas is often attributed to the presence of communications
media and/or, missionary work.37
Socio-psychological theories diverge from classical theories of revolution by
concentrating on perceived dissatisfaction rather than the inadequacy of tangible goods, resulting
from the existing socio-economic structure.38 Karl Marx attributed revolution to the exploitative
nature of the capitalist system; he, therefore, focused on the alienation that emerged as a result of
the existing socio-economic structure the regime largely helped maintain. Though he discusses
alienation, he does not full explain on how the psychological aspects of exploitation are linked to
the structural features that are believed to lead to revolution. Marx refrained from considering the
micro, behavioral-oriented, characteristics of anti-systemic mobilization, which scholars like
Davies and Gurr integrated into existing ideas of revolution.

Macro-level theoretical frameworks
Classical economic theories of popular mobilization are often associated with Marx, as he
was one of the original scholars to present a basic set of ideas and assumptions pertaining to
revolution. While theories of popular mobilization have greatly evolved since then, it is
impossible to deny the significant role that classic works, like those of Marx have had on current
theories. Marx largely built the foundation for contemporary theories of mobilization by fusing
elements of the social structure of society and politics with focus on economics. Much of the
philosophical foundations of Marx’s literature on revolution, however, can be attributed to
George Hegel’s ideas of historical change; as his philosophies set the framework for a
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revolutionary theory of society that was mostly absent among European intellectuals of the
time.39 Hegel argued that the mind and spirit were the forces responsible for the development of
history and that interaction between two of the elements (the thesis and the antithesis), would
result in a rebellion, which he perceived as beneficial for human development. 40 Marx adapted
Hegel’s dialectic to construct a theory of mobilization that was less abstract and more applicable
to prevailing political and economic circumstances. Marx applied that dialectic to the
relationship between the dominant social classes, which emerged as a result of capitalism. He
argued that society was bound by a dynamic tension “between the means (or forces) of
production-the technical, material, natural, and human resources that are brought into play in the
provision of life's necessities, such as food, clothing, and shelter and the relations of production,
which consists of those social arrangements that groups of men and women develop by which to
organize the provision of those necessities”.41
Marx mostly believed that while labor is good for the development of man, constant
uniform labor, most often found in the capitalist system, is not. 42 Such labor is purely for
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Ronald H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics : The Search for a Paradigm
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981)79.
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ibid 78 “ the dialectic consists of three elements: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. For
Hegel, each stage of history is characterized by a dominant viewpoint or idea, which represents
the thesis. Through its elaboration, the thesis produces its own contradictions or oppositions,
which formulate themselves into a contrary viewpoint or idea, the antithesis. The antithesis
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University Press, 1990)16-17.
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advancing the accumulation of capital and is therefore only beneficial to the bourgeoisie that
financially profit from the output. From this perspective, repetitious labor is detrimental to
humanity as it prevents the flow of man’s natural spirit. 43 In this system, proletariats (workers)
are essentially exploited and used merely as a source of production. They thereby experience
alienation. Theoretically, the goal is to advance to a Communist system, which from this
perspective is egalitarian in nature. In order to evolve, however, exploitation must be eradicated
through the process of revolution. From a Marxist perspective revolution is, therefore, perceived
as a positive process/event in the evolution of civilization. Marx believed that revolutions occur
only when objective structural conditions are conducive to mobilization, and that those
conditions only materialize by the conflict that emerges in the process of capital production. 44
Marx’s theory of revolution is heavily structure-based. However, he clearly
acknowledges the presence of a psychological component to mobilization. He uses the phrase
“alienation” to describe why portions of the population, in this case the proletariats; behave as
they do in capitalist systems. Alienation essentially describes the psychological components
associated with micro level markers of public mobilization and revolutionary change. It is the
feeling of isolation that an individual within a society experiences as a result of a particular
phenomenon, which in this case is attributed to circumstances that are typically social, political
or economic in nature. Although the term is widely used among scholars within political
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“Marx insists that the same mechanism that holds society together in dynamic tension – the
conflict between the forces and relations of production – is also the force that will create the
objective conditions for revolution. What is more, these objective conditions occur
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towards revolution by any social groups. Revolutions may be made by discontented people, but
they can only do so when the objective structural conditions are already conducive to
revolution”.
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philosophy, in the fields of international relations and comparative politics it is most often
associated with Marxian ideas of the psychological implications of structures that are largely an
amalgamation of social, political and economic elements. 45 Marx’s theory, therefore, falls within
the parameters of micro/ mid level theories of mobilization, because it makes use of the social
conditions of the working class and the economic structure of the capitalist system to support
popular mobilization.
These theories tend to focus on the state as the level of analysis and the element most
responsible for mobilization.46 Theda Skocpol claims that mobilization is the consequence of a
malfunctioning state.47 From this perspective, however, the state is viewed as a military and
administrative institution that is used to extract resources from the population so as to maintain
stability and competiveness in the global atmosphere. 48 This approach does not apply the
psychological elements that were present in classical micro-structural theories like that of Marx.
Instead, the state is the central level of analysis because this perspective of instability is
attributed to the political authority’s inability to maintain order and compete in the global
atmosphere. 49
World Systems theory (WST) is a post-Marxist framework that addresses revolution by
analyzing exploitation on a global level by concentrating on external dyanamics.50 This
theoretical framework was developed in the 1970’s by Immanuel Wallerstein and later expanded
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on in the 1980’s by Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Wallerstein
himself. It builds heavily on Marxists principles of class struggle, exploitation, alienation, classconsciousness and revolution to illustrate macro-level indicators of revolution, often neglected
by other theories of revolution. Those who adhere to a WST framework attribute the widening
socio-economic imbalance to the capitalist nature of the system. Instead of focusing solely on the
structure of individual states and the events occurring specifically in those particular states, like
classical Marxist and social-psychological approaches largely do; WST theorists broaden the
level of analysis, thereby expanding causal factors to forces that originate outside of the state
itself. Revolution, from this perspective, is perceived as an inevitable and a welcomed
consequence of the economic structure of the global system.
WST views the nature of the relationship between developed and underdeveloped
nations in terms of a spatial hierarchy that was given the opportunity to develop as a result of
industrialization.51Industrialization, from this perspective, led to the emergence of a North-South
global divide that consisted of nations that used their advances in technology, as a tool for
suppression and exploitation. This framework largely opposes orientalist notions of
underdevelopment that rely on ethnic or cultural factors as parameters for development.52
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Instead, they view imperialism, carried out through colonialist and neo-colonialist policies, as the
source of the disparity that exists between developed and underdeveloped nations.
From this perspective, the developed state essentially fits within the role of what Marx
referred to as the bourgeoisie, while the underdeveloped takes on the role of the proletariat.53
Scholars that use this framework largely contend that capital furthering policies, implemented by
the core, impair peripheral state growth, thereby leading to exploitation that is then upheld by
certain segments of the population that are located within the developing states themselves.54
What distinguishes core and peripheral states from each other is the ability to control the
accumulation of capital; peripheral states have little to no, local control of the accumulation of
capital because the global system largely deters such states from economic expansion, by
essentially making diversification costly. 55 Peripheral states therefore rely on single or limited
commodity exports that leave them more vulnerable to fluctuations in the global market. They
contend that the internal dynamics of periphery states are directly impacted by the fluctuating
demand for exports. The political authority often becomes more oppressive if global demand for
its resources declines, because the bulk of a developing nation’s revenue, used to provide
services, is generated through single commodity exports. When services are reduced or
eliminated as a result of such fluctuation, the citizenry is more responsive to corruption, which
then leads to an increase in repression. Economic volatility therefore prohibits the social and
economic development of peripheral states that, when combined with other features, leads to
revolution.
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Limitations of Existing Theories
While Marx’s theory of revolution has many shortfalls, one of the central problems with
the theory is applicability. Marx claims that revolutions are the desired outcome of the tension
that emerges between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and that such events are limited to
advanced capitalist systems. In the last century, however, revolutions have occurred only in
agrarian societies. Advanced capitalist societies’ have not even mildly encountered the prospects
of revolutionary transformation, as Marx claimed. Another problem with the theory is that it is
focuses too much on socio-economic and structural causes of revolution without properly
connecting them to the psychological elements of mobilization.56 Although structural matters are
vital for any working theory of revolution, mobilization simply cannot transpire without
individual action. Also, it fails to consider global matters that influence the socio-economic
structure of a state as macro level theories do.
The problem with state-centered theories of mobilization is that they completely overlook
the cultural and psychological elements that contribute to mobilization because they view the
state as the central level of analysis and the source of instability. Skocpol indicates that while the
state is indeed autonomous from the control of the dominant social class, the “… actual extent
and consequences of state autonomy can only be explained in terms [of] specific to particular
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types of political systems and set historical international circumstances.” 57 It appears that from
this perspective, even the state is bound by historical and political elements that simply cannot be
separated from dynamics that are social in nature.
In contrast, macro-level theories of mobilization suffer from explanatory flaws that are
mostly attributed to focusing far too much on structural or economic discussions that overlook
the relevance of human micro-level behavior. The case study of the Egyptian uprising is just one
example in which WST framework is completely inapplicable. Its high import to export ratio is
indicative of a nation that is generally lacking the tangible exports necessary to fit the economic
parameters of peripheral state. This is particularly interesting because Egypt does not have the
characteristics of an export driven economy that properly fits within a global socio-economic
paradigm, yet it encountered anti-systemic mobilization, which resulted in the fall of Hosni
Mubarak. The Egyptian uprisings were due to a combination of disparity among its populace,
these conditions, however, are not the result of circumstances typical to export-driven, rentier
states that are exploited for raw materials; they are far more complex than something that could
be exclusively addressed with a macro economic framework. Anti-systemic mobilization does
not have to be simply a result of economic domination through resource exploitation, as World
Systems theorists have argued in the past. Revolutions could be a response to rising global
awareness of policies that go beyond the core’s short-term economic interests. This was in the
case in Egypt. The relationship of dependancy between Egypt and the United States fostered
conditions that relied heavily on opression to survice. Psychological theories compliment postMarxist global socio-economic theories such as WST, because they account for psychological
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elements of mobilization and in turn, result in a greater ability to predict anti-systemic
movements.
WST frameworks are particularly useful in studies pertaining to revolutions because they
focus on the structural aspects of the global economic environment that are often mistakenly
overlooked, or simply ignored by other theories. However, the problem with classical WSTbased frameworks is that they have to rely on non-economic parameters to address anti-systemic
mobilization in low-export states that fail to meet the guidelines of their global export-driven
model. Poor economic conditions and the dynamics associated with such environments are
indicators of mass anti-systemic mobilization. There are numerous psychological elements that
enhance the desire to mobilize. However, WST framework generally avoids discussions
pertaining to the micro level indicators of mobilization that psych-social theories are able to
address.
As indicated above, there are numerous theories for explaining why individuals
collectively mobilize (as those in the Arab world have done). There is no doubt that the Arab
Spring/ Awakening/ Uprisings 58 have revolutionary characteristics. However, there is an
existing debate about the root cause of these particular anti-systemic episodes and the origins of
mass mobilization in general. Although there are numerous theories on causative factors of
revolution that were not mentioned in this work, most tend to adopt a particular level of analysis
and therefore leave many questions unanswered.59 Existing theories tend to fall short of properly
addressing the diverse characteristics of the Arab world’s political landscape.
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The theories of revolution discussed appear to adhere to one level of analysis or another.
Rarely do they fuse macro and micro level dynamics to broaden theoretical predictability. While
such approaches allow for more concise theoretical explanations of social change, their
predictive capacity is virtually always challenged by factors addressed in alternate levels of
analysis. The heterogeneous nature of the foundations of contemporary Arab mobilization
essentially makes the use of single-level paradigms particularly problematic. The uprisings are
not just the result of malfunctions in the structure of the state, nor can they wholly be attributed
to the psychological characteristics of the Arab people. The uprisings are due to a fusion of
global socio-economic characteristics, established through imperialist policies, as well as
perceived deprivation that stems from increased social interaction. To construct a comprehensive
theoretical explanation for the Arab uprisings, it is imperative to account for a series of factors
that often range between multiple levels of analysis. In this particular circumstance, it is crucial
to address dynamics that are both structural and psychological in nature, while also accounting
for factors that serve as a tool for linking the two together. In order to properly understand the
Arab uprisings, it is essential to examine the impact that the global capitalist socio-economic
structure of the world system, for which the Arab world has little control over, has on the
underlying dynamics of Arab politics. Once achieved, one can then construct an idea of
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transformation of the society’s state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part
carried through by class-based revolts from below” (1974, 4). Political revolutions however
differ from those that are social in nature in that “…they are not necessarily accomplished
through class conflict” and they are largely confined to transforming the political structure of the
state; they have little to no impact on the social structure. Rebellions on other hand “…even
when successful, may involve the revolts of subordinate classes – but they do not eventuate in
structural change” (1974, 3). While Skocpol does include the central components of
revolutionary transformation, her distinctions place severe and unnecessary constraints by
creating far too many subgroups. Revolutions are social movements that include transformation
on all levels.
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contemporary Arab political behavior that accounts for societal changes that have emerged as a
result of heightened social interaction.

A Theoretical Synthesis
Wide-scale anti-systemic mobilization indicates a given citizenry’s profound aversion to
state policies and practices. While this form of mobilization suggests an overall disillusionment
with the state, it does not imply that public interests are homogenous. Public interests and
demands are based on interplay of dynamics that often fluctuate depending on the perceived
condition of the citizenry.60 On a macro level they are shaped by the political and economic
structure of the global system that often influences the state to behave in a way that can result in
citizens feeling deprived. On a micro level these are influenced by psychological components,
such as the emotions that lead the citizenry to feel deprived. Mobilization occurs when the
population at large experiences a sense of deprivation as a result of threats to safety/security
and/or social, political and economic concerns.61 Deprivations are measured against a dynamic,
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"The term ‘marginalization’ refers to two main issues. The first issue is the significant
reduction in involvement in society and the considerable loss of opportunities experienced by
certain groups or individuals within a specific society, with a consequent breakdown of ties
either in terms of social control or in terms of reciprocal solidarity. Such reduction leads to a
progressive decline in social participation, an increase in the level of poverty and ongoing
exclusion from social agencies such as schools, the job market, political communities and so on.
When taken to the extreme, this process results in people becoming dropouts or clochards and
completely refusing the social values and ties of the society. The other issue - which although
connected to the former does not completely overlap with it - is that even in such seemingly fluid
structures as democratic societies, in which all players have equal opportunities to move within
the social context, and especially to move up and down the social ladder, there are relatively
rigid or semi-rigid elements which considerably reduce the social mobility of the members of
some groups, condemning them to a future of marginalization. In other words, such group
members do not share the same opportunities to improve their condition in society as others due
to being denied access to positions of power, prestige and wealth”.
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yet universal, order of human concerns that generally hold true across anthropological spectrums.
Citizens, therefore, mobilize because their perceptions of existing conditions 62 do not align with
what they want it to be.63
Within societies, there is a basic structural hierarchy that is necessitated by the fluctuating
demands of humans at the individual level.64 Society often holds the political authority/state
accountable for the fulfillment of those demands and expectations. The hierarchy largely consists
of a series of needs and preferences, with physiological and safety needs clearly taking
precedence over all others because of their role in in the process of human survival. 65 The
remaining are those that are largely social in nature, that is, they need only to be met within the
presence of a social backdrop; they are not essential to survival, but can be significantly
important within society.
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Existing conditions in regareds to how they believe they are being deprived.
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This is because heightened social interaction through technology has opened doors to new
ways of life [whether real or not] that are often more desirable than the current situation.
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Abraham Maslow first discussed this in this in his research on the hierarchal structure of
human needs.
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It is important to note that the hierarchy is not fixed; its flexible in that it does not apply to
the deprived, psychopaths and those that have been satisfied for an extensive period of time. See
David D. Van Fleet, "The Need-Hierarchy and Theories of Authority,"Human Relations 26, no.
5 (October 01, 1973).
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Figure 1. A

!
Physiological necessities such as access to food, water and shelter are most vital in the
hierarchy of needs demanded of the state. Physiological needs are paramount in the order of
demands because of the crucial role they play in human survival. Evidence suggests that issues
pertaining to food and water have indeed been at the center of much of the anti-systemic
movements that have taken place in the modern era, with food prices being one of the central
motives for mobilization.66 Studies have found that citizens tend to hold the state/political
authority responsible when food prices rise beyond a reasonable level, irrespective of the state’s
role. 67 Once those physiological needs have been met, however, citizens turn their attention to
demanding safety via protection from danger because they are essential to self-preservation. 68
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Nation-states are expected to maintain the safety of their populace from both internal and
external threats. Externally, the state is expected to preserve the security of its populace by
defending its physical borders69 from both military and non-military threats.70 Internally, the
state is expected to ensure the physical welfare of its population through policies that provide
domestic security and stability.
After the physiological and safety demands have been met, society shifts its focus to
subjects pertaining to human development. Matters such as the economy, along with political
and social concerns, move to the top of the agenda. These demands tend to be more dynamic as
they often fluctuate as a result of individual preference. With that said, issues that are economic
in nature often take primacy over social ones. The prospect of anti-systemic mobilization
significantly increases when economic conditions, real or perceived, are unfavorable. This is true
because both urban and rural parts of society experience the complications associated with basic
disparities such as an increase in the price of food, housing, and textiles.71
While it is true that economic conditions alone are not enough to bring about protest, states that
fail to meet the economic demands of the population overtime are indeed more prone to
experiencing mass anti-systemic mobilization. This is because poor economic circumstances
have a lasting psychological impact on society, as they often affect access to those elements 72
that are found to be fundamental to human survival. 73
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Once the more critical demands necessary to survival have been met, citizens shift their
focus to other issues that may further advance living conditions. Heightened social interaction as
a result of access to technology and social media, however, exposes individuals to a surge of
information that allows them to gain new ideas about the world around them. How accurate or
true to reality these ideas are is not of importance, as this exposure alone is enough to cause
individuals to reevaluate their demands. This is where the impact of the global economic system
becomes visible. The peripheral/dependent economic role of developing states severely limits the
periphery’s capacity to deliver on the needs and preferences demanded by its population. When
this is paired with unmet social and political demands, it results in an environment that is ideal
for breeding anti-systemic protest and mobilization. Ultimately it does not matter if there is
empirical evidence of the state’s inability to deliver on demands; the perception of their existence
is sufficient enough for mobilization.
Externally, the structure of the global system and the policies that are pursued by the
global hegemons lead to an environment that are derived by the political and economic
foundations of neoliberalism. These policies are centered on selective instability, patron-client
state relations and the use of force to eliminate resistance to Western political and economic
domination. Given the economic circumstances and the lack of development within the Arab
world, the leaders of these countries often agree to trade deals and aid that further deepen their
dependence on the Western world. Arab autocrats serve as a conduit for Western imperial
policies at the insistence of their colonial overseers and to the detriment of the interests of their
populace.
The lack of economic diversity in the Arab worlds allows these states to fall victim to
predatory economic policies pursued by the West. These states are intentionally encouraged to
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privatize and engage in trade deals that are financially beneficial to the West. This is particularly
true in predominantly oil producing states. States with minimal or negligible fossil fuel resources
including Egypt are of great geo-strategic significance to the West. These states are forced to
pursue pro-western policies by resorting to an array of strategies including threats of regime
change as well as economic and military assistance.
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Chapter Two
Domestic Origins of Instability in the Arab World
The Arab world’s current political landscape is influenced by the remnants of its deep
colonial past. Arab nation-states are the culmination of decades of Western political influence
that emerged from the power vacuum that was produced with the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
The dismantling of the Ottoman Empire enabled French and British colonial powers to shape the
political map of post-WWI Middle East by constructing dependent nation-states throughout the
region.74 Therefore, much of the Arab world today consists of states that suffer from various
internal complications associated with the historical underpinnings upon which the states were
founded. The current political landscape of the region is, therefore, greatly due to exogenous
factors. It is a consequence of colonialism 75 and the involuntary transition to the nation-state
system, rather than simply a product of natural political development.

The Nature of Arab States
Arab states are generally known for their autocratic approach to governance. Politics
within the states consist of an amalgamation of both traditional, tribal networks, and semibureaucratic elements that often clash when operating alongside each other. The fusion of these
two results in states that, while on the path to development, suffer from significant structural
impediments, which inhibit the developmental process. Their most prominent feature is the style
of leadership that dominates throughout them. These states are predominantly autocratic, that is,
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with the exception of a few hybrid regimes such as Lebanon, post-Saddam Iraq and the
Palestinian Authority. 76 Arab leaders hold a monopoly over power, maintaining almost full
control over the decision-making apparatus. Power is, therefore, exceedingly centralized in these
countries.77 78 Arab dictators exercise almost exclusive control over state institutions. This is true
of not only parliaments and judiciary branches, if they exist, but also lower level institutions as
well.79
Arab states are neo-patrimonial, that is, unlike the older patrimonial forms of governance
they contain some degree of institutionalization. They are characterized by personal rulership 80
and an executive branch that is constructed around the character of the individual in power. The
government cannot be separated from the leader himself. What would the Ghaddafi regime have
been without the eccentric Muammar Ghaddafi (1942-2011) as its leader. The same is true of the
former regimes of Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, as well as
Bashar Hafez al-Assad, the current leader of Syria. These states are manufactured around the
character of their leaders. Their leadership style, their personalities, their religious leanings, as
well as tribal and sectarian associations are all intertwined in the structure of the government.
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, like nearly all other Arab states, are governed by neopatrimonial forms of leadership. The first president of Tunisia81 held office for over thirty years
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and though he was eventually removed in 1987, the personalistic tribal nature of the Tunisian
regime simply carried on with Ben-Ali. 82 This was also true in Egypt. Following the defeat of
the Egyptian monarchy, all of Egypt’s presidents83 have acknowledged the political significance
of familial, religious, and regional considerations in their political institutions and practices.
Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat84 and Hosni Mubarak were all known to utilize their power to
fill government positions with individuals that largely followed their own ideological
proclivities. Although Mubarak tried in many ways to conceal the amount of power he wielded
via institutions, it was no secret that he maintained almost exclusive control over the Egyptian
government. Mubarak was able to staff his administration with individuals that were loyal to
him because, as chairman of the National Democratic Party (NDP), he had direct control of who
would be permitted to the party. 85 Both Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez al-Assad of Syria
are famously known for staffing nearly all government positions with members of their own
minority sect known as Alawites. 86 This has enabled the Assad regime to maintain control over
a nation that is composed of mostly Sunni Muslims. 87 Muammar Ghaddafi was priming his son
Saif al-Islam for presidency prior to the uprisings that resulted in his ouster and eventual death. 88
He too maintained control of the state through a sturdy patron-client system, which was
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comprised mostly of close friends and family. Like these other Arab dictators, the Ghaddafi
family not only controlled the state, they even owned or had a hand in nearly every major
business venture in the country and held absolute control of the state. 89
Middle Eastern countries hold few, if any, contestable elections in comparison to other
parts of the developing world.90 They are generally a one-party state, which means elections, and
the laws pertaining to them, are manipulated in a way to allow the existing autocrats to remain in
power.91 These regimes use political elections as a tool for projecting an illusion of pluralism. In
reality, citizens have very little, if any, input in government decision-making. This is particularly
true in terms of executive elections because there is absolutely no competition in that realm.
Elections are utilized to placate the public and conjure an image of formal political competition.
This competition, however, does not exist. It is merely a way to appease political opponents and
appeal to international donors.92 Laws often place severe restrictions on the development of new
parties and there is a substantial amount of electoral manipulation via ballot tampering,
imprisoning voters, and simply preventing individuals from casting their votes. 93 94 This façade
allows Arab leaders to prolong the lifespan of their regimes because it distracts political
opponents with costly, semi-democratic activities that give the illusion of democracy. 95 96
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Arab leaders continually win by extremely high margins, with some exceeding 90 percent
of the vote. 97 Such electoral outcomes signify that elections, specifically executive ones, are
fixed to result in explicit political outcomes that benefit the regime. As a result, states such as
Egypt experience extremely low voter turnout from voter apathy.98
In the 2004 presidential election in Tunisia, Ben-Ali had what the regime claimed to be a
margin of victory of 94.5 percent. 99 In 2006, Mubarak walked away with an 81 percent margin
of victory in the presidential election in Egypt. Despite the sectarian based civil war in Syria,
Assad had over an 88 percent margin of victory in the 2014 presidential election. 100 These
numbers are conflated so as to present an image of strong popular support. They are in no way
representative of the free and fair elections that take place in democratic systems.
Politics and decision-making in these countries tend to occur outside of institutions.
Unions, political parties, legislatures, bureaucracies and militaries often lack the political
relevance that is common in democratic systems. 101 Formal institutions house informal groups in
which most of the politicking occurs, thus political institutions often contain vast amounts of
tribal and sectarian political elements. 102 The tribal, familial, sectarian ties are what enable these
autocracies to stay in power, as they enable a higher degree of internal cohesion and stability.
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Institutions in these countries often serve as a tool for creating the myth of a division
between the public and the private sphere. These distinctions are mostly an illusion that is used
to placate the population. Comparatively speaking, these systems are more advanced than the
traditional patrimonial/patriarchal states which were common in the pre-nation-state Arab world.
This is because they contain institutional elements which traditional patriarchal and patrimonial
systems lacked. These institutions, however, mostly serve as a tool for concealing the
concentration of authority within them. State institutions within these countries, specifically
political ones, are used more as a means to “facilitate power sharing among the elites,”103 rather
than to serve any genuine function for society. They essentially enable Arab leaders to gain
political leverage by distributing high paying bureaucratic appointments to supporters.
The nature of these states, specifically the informality of politics and the overwhelming
presence of nepotism, prevent Arab bureaucracies from functioning in a manner conducive to the
process of democratization. The reliance on tribal, sectarian and clan-based ties results in
arrangements that favor government appointments based on personal relations rather than merit.
Tribal solidarity is, therefore, preferred over “utilitarian and universalistic principles…” 104 In
these countries even marriages are used strategically to cultivate political alliances.
These leaders exercise extensive amounts of control over all branches of the state. The
centralization of authority undercuts accountability within the bureaucratic elements of the state.
State officials blame bottlenecking and the lack of initiative,105 which frequently takes place
within institutions on the nature of the regime and the need for consent from higher ups. Arab
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bureaucracies, therefore, lack authority over their domain, which bureaucracies in western
democratic states tend to have.106 This dysfunction within Arab institutions generally hinders the
distribution of services to the populace, 107 thereby preventing the emergence of a fully
functioning bureaucracy, which is crucial to the developmental process.
Corruption is common within Arab states and it is found at all levels of government. Arab
leaders and the officials they appoint to the bureaucracy use their authority to extract resources
from the state for private use. Although Arab nations are resource-rich, much of the profit from
natural resources such as oil, cotton, etc. never reach the public. Nearly 60 percent of states
within the region rank above the international mean, in terms of the presence of corruption (See
Table 1 for data on corruption).108 Corruption ranges from small bribes to more invasive and
damaging forms, such as the annexation of government land and the theft of equipment and
government assets for personal use. The presence of this phenomenon clearly hinders the state’s
capacity to properly function because it depletes the state of resources that are necessary for
infrastructure and social programs.
This type of Corruption was indisputably present in the Ben-Ali regime. The extent of
the regime’s corruption, however, only became visible when Wikileaks published U.S. State
Department cables pointing to the depths of the regime’s corruption. 109 These documents
revealed that Ben-Ali’s extended family had amassed large fortunes by using their proximity to
the president and state resources to develop and, in some circumstances, illegally seize local
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businesses.110 111 The Trebelsi family’s rise to power and affluence was the product of Leila
Trebelsi’s marriage to president Ben-Ali. Before his ouster, Ben-Ali and his extended family
had come to own over 180 Tunisian businesses, including but not limited to airlines, banks,
hotels, radio stations, car manufacturing plants, private schools and various pieces of real-estate.
112

Ben-Ali’s wife smuggled over 56 million dollars worth of gold bullion on her private jet prior

to Ben-Ali’s ouster. 113
The Egyptian regime was similarly plagued by corruption. Mubarak used the adoption of
neoliberal (economic) reforms as a vehicle for looting and dispersing state resources among his
friends and family. 114 Mubarak’s eldest son was known to use his father’s name to overcome
bureaucratic barriers in exchange for shares of profits from business deals that he pushed
through. 115 His younger son Gamal was known for using his training in banking and his access
to privileged information in regards to government reforms to grow his wealth through insider
trading. 116Smaller forms of corruption were just as common in the Egyptian state. Government
workers often subsidized their shrinking paychecks by demanding bribery and kickbacks from
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the population.117 Growing income inequality among those within the Ministry of Interior in
Egypt encouraged police officers to take advantage of the state and its people as well. Many
made their living through bribery, money laundering and extortion.118
Tribal and clan-based relations are the foundation for power and politics in Tunisia,
Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen.119 Ben-Ali used his power to essentially blur the lines between
the public and private spheres in order to monopolize power and wealth among clans that were
close to him. His friends and family were awarded with the ability to default on government
loans, form duopolies and monopolies, and benefit from forced joint business ventures. 120 The
Mubarak regime of Egypt was also based on a series of familial and clan-based relationships.
Those within his close-knit circle of friends and family gained a stake in nearly every large
business venture in Egypt. 121 Public interests were of little concern for Hosni Mubarak because
his entourage, consisting mostly of friends and family, had control of largely all components of
the Egyptian government. 122 Also this could be said for Ghaddafi of Libya and Saleh of Yemen
and still true with Assad of Syria. These autocrats surrounded themselves with close friends and
relatives, strategically placing individuals within military and bureaucratic institutions so as to
control and profit from nearly all elements of the state. 123 All of the upper echelons of the Syrian
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military are comprised of members of Assad’s own largely Alawite based Ba’ath party.124 In
the case of Libya, Ghaddafi formed a parallel security force that consisted of close friends and
family to counter the state military, which initially had a rather strained relationship with his
regime.

125

Arab leaders often attempt to derive authoritative legitimacy through religious and
monarchic traditions that simply cannot function alongside the institutional structure of the
modern nation-state.126 They do not represent the sovereign will of the Arab populace, that is,
they do not act on behalf of the desire of Arab population. This is why they use coercion as a
means to maintaining control. Coercion is used as a substitute for legitimacy; it is utilized to get
the populace to acquiesce to decisions made by the regime. 127
These autocrats maintain absolute control by having a rather effective apparatus for
repression.128 They have a monopoly over power because they have the capacity to use state
resources such as the military, police, and other institutions to thwart potential dangers to the
regime. In these countries, state institutions are more often than not used for coercion in detering
the populace from organizing activities that could in any way threaten the regime’s existence.
Arab autocracies use a combination of coercive methods that include both violent and nonviolent forms of repression such as violations of both physical rights and civil liberties.129 They
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also reduce impending threats to authority by killing, imprisoning or making dissidents
disappear, which not only contest the regimes’ legitimacy but also potential electoral opponents
and political adversaries which gain too much attention. 130
Ben-Ali used government mechanisms for taxation and social security to coerce those
who opposed his regime. His government was known for imposing illicit fines/taxes on those
that defied the government.131 His regime like others, took a firm stance against Islamist groups.
Even those that challenged him through democratic means were imprisoned, tortured, and
killed.132 Mubarak, like Ben-Ali also utilized state mechanisms creatively and to his advantage.
He strategically used the emergency law, which the state was operating under after the
assassination of Anwar Sadat, to enforce policies aimed at preventing regime disturbances. 133
The Mubarak regime was known for being particularly brutal to its citizenry. His government
jailed, tortured, and killed numerous members of the Muslim Brotherhood. This behavior was
not strictly reserved for Islamist groups; ordinary citizens were often abused by the regime as
well. The regime was responsible for over 460 cases of torture and 167 cases of death attributed
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to torture. 134 Ghaddafi who referred to himself as the “King of Kings” 135 also took a hard stance
against those who challenged his regime. Those who were suspected of spreading anti regime
rhetoric were abused, tortured and imprisoned.136 Ghaddafi was known to be exceptionally
tough on Islamist groups in Libya, because their institutionalized structure enabled them to have
the capacity to organize, and potentially threaten his authority. He also considered them to be a
byproduct of imperialism so he particularly loathed their existence. In the late 1980s Ghaddafi
started what would be the systematic oppression of various groups, which threatened the stability
of his regime. 137He specifically targeted members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad and
Takfir Wa Hijra because of their growing power.138

Impediments to Development
State institutions in Arab countries are dysfunctional because most of bureaucrats
employed, within the upper segments of the bureaucracy of these states, lack the skills required
for the positions they hold. This is because high-ranking positions within institutions are given as
reward for loyalty to the regime. Most high ranking/high paying positions in state institutions are
occupied by individuals that are related to the leader; this system of patronage enables a give!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134
Emily Loftis, "Mubarak's Horrific Human Rights Legacy," Mother Jones,
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2011/01/mubaraks-human-rights-record (accessed september
2015, 2015).
135
Marwan Bisharah, The Invisible Arab: The Promise and Peril of the Arab Revolutions
(New York, NY: Nation Books, 2012) 36.
136
Mathias Gebauer, "Oppression in Libya: A Peek at the Inner Workings of Gadhafi's
Regime," SPiegel.de, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/oppression-in-libya-a-peek-atthe-inner-workings-of-gadhafi-s-dictatorship-a-747665.html (accessed September 4, 2015).
137
According to some, repression in these states tends to take on a curvilinear shape. Lower
levels of repression correlate with lower levels of mobilization, whereas higher levels of
repression correlate with circumstances that hamper public mobilization.
138
Luis Martinez, "Libya: The Conversion of a 'Terrorist State'," Mediterranean Politics 11,
no. 2 (2006) 157.
!

!
!

49!

and-take relationship to ensue, with those close to the leader profiting from his authority. The
leader profits from the power he receives from controlling the bureaucratic elements of the state.
139

Thus, those serving within state institutions often lack the merit/ expertise/ knowledge

necessary to enable these institutions function as they were intended to. 140 This is why Arab
bureaucrats frequently turn to friends and family for guidance on how to proceed with projects.
While it may seem that cronyism in the Arab world is motivated solely by personal gain, it can
also be attributed to the overwhelming lack of expertise among Arab bureaucrats.141 This lack of
expertise, when paired with overwhelming amounts of corruption, leads to inefficient and
dysfunctional institutions.
Political conditions in these countries can complicate life for Arab citizens. The nature of
these states and their lack of democracy in particular, prevent citizens from organizing to make
demands. Because of this, there is a huge disconnect between what people want and what the
regimes want. 142 These governments essentially do the bare minimum for their citizens; just
enough avert a popular revolt, and nothing more. As a result, most Arab regimes are
continuously on the brink of being overthrown, making just enough concessions to remain in
power. For these reasons, most citizen demands are left unmet.
The unique geo-political circumstances in the region force Arab countries to spend
comparatively more on security in terms of GDP than other countries with similar levels of
development. This is because Arab states need to procure arms to silence opposition and because
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they are surrounded by states with similar security issues. Arab governments spend
approximately 2-5 times more than Latin American countries143 in terms of percentage of GDP
for military expenses.144 145 With the exception of Columbia, Most Latin American states spend
between 1-1.5 percent of their GDP for military expenses. Arab countries, however, spend
anywhere from approximately 3-9 percent of their GDP. 146 The problem in these countries is
that spending does not translate to safety for the people. Though there is no data on the allocation
of funds for domestic security, given the nature of the regimes, it is safe to assume that a
significant portion of military spending is used for internal oppression. So while most of these
institutions operate under the guise of protecting the people, regime fortification takes priority.
147

Citizen safety interests are, therefore, not only left unmet by the regime, but the regime itself

also becomes a safety concern for the people.
Domestically speaking, there are additional safety concerns. The rise of militant Islamists
groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS/ISIL and the dangers associated with their growth in recent years
has been particularly problematic. The growing presence of militant groups in Iraq, Yemen,
Syria and Saudi Arabia 148 has become a terrifying reality to those who live in the Arab world.
These organizations are known to harm innocent people and businesses. They do this to instill
fear and draw attention to their objectives. Militant Islamist groups are linked to violence
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throughout the Middle East and North Africa.149 Daily life in the Arab world is persistently
challenged by the growing presence of Islamist groups. 150 Arab states have made efforts to
thwart damage done by militant Islamist groups. They attempt to secure major landmarks and
tourist areas but the unpredictable nature of these groups simply prevents these regimes from
fully protecting the Arab populace.
The fear of the prospects of a nuclear Iran and the political repercussions of its
conceivable emergence as a regional hegemon compounds the security concerns of both these
states and their citizens.151 Iran’s military presence in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria is worrisome to
conservative Arab regimes because its growing power will produce changes that will likely shift
sectarian dynamics in favor of Shiites, as they have in both Syria and Iraq. While for Shi’ite
Arabs this may be a welcome change, the majority of Arabs, which are Sunni, simply do not
want Shi’ites acquiring even more power and influence in the region than they already have.152
Iran’s support for the Assad regime has illustrated the deep political and ideological differences
that are present within the region. Domestically, the relationship between the two countries
“…counterbalances conservative Arab policies and strategies. This alliance, also helps offset
Israels’ leverage in the Persian Gulf, increases influence among radical Islamist groups in
Lebanon/Palestine and impacts engagement with the West. It also provides the Syrian regime
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with weapons, economic support and assistance with containing domestic radical opposition”.153
This is no doubt troubling for Sunni Muslim.
Arab states cannot provide or sustain the living conditions that are demanded by their
citizenry because of the financial burdens associated with the presence of wide-scale corruption
and the lack of a functional institutional apparatus. This is because most 154 resource rich Arab
states with little to no taxation, are single commodity exporters155 which rely heavily on export
profits for the state’s operation.156 The lack of export diversity, therefore, makes their economies
more volatile. As a result, they often experience more pronounced revenue fluctuations and
therefore, less financial stability. Economic instability, due to fluctuations in export income that
results from variable market demand, frequently hinders the delivery of public services. In some
circumstances, it completely eliminates costly infrastructure-based services/projects in the Arab
world. 157 To further increase the burden, the line that separates public from private is blurred in
the Arab world. Arab leaders and their entourage steal state resources, thereby using funds from
state projects for their own personal use, 158 further complicating state budgeting.
All Arab states, regardless of their financial capacity, have poor urban infrastructure.
These governments avoid funding the development of rural areas because they tend to lack the
immediate financial incentives that oil, natural gas, minerals and other services offer. 159 These
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153
Autoosa Kojoori-Saatchi and Mehran Tamadonfar, Why Stalemate?: The Syrian Conflict
and the Sectarian Divide19
154
Egypt is an exception because the resource it offers is geostrategic in nature. Its proximity
to Israel and the Suez Canal set Egypt apart from other Arab countries.
155
Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab Word," Arab Studies Quarterly 9, no. 4
(1987) 386.
156
Luis Martínez 1965, The Violence of Petro-Dollar Regimes: Algeria, Iraq, and
LibyaColumbia University Press, 2012) 24.
157
Ibid.
158
Beblawi, The Rentier State in the Arab Word387
159
Such as the rents from the Suez Canal.
!

!
!

53!

states, therefore, often experience extensive volumes of rural-to-urban migration. An “urban
bias” 160 forces those unable to live in rural areas to relocate to cities where they can obtain the
necessities that are otherwise not available to them due to low wages, poor education, and a lack
of jobs.161 Shantytowns and slums surround major cities because of housing shortages attributed
to a lack of affordable housing and overpopulation. 162 These conditions force low wage laborers
to take residence in makeshift homes that often lack running water and utilities.163 Cairo is a
good example of this particular problem. The lack of affordable housing has resulted in the
emergence of various types of shantytowns, ranging from proper brick and mortar buildings to
tin covered structures that lack running water and utilities. 164
Life in Arab cities is further complicated by outdated city planning methods. Major cities
experience severe overcrowding due to poor city planning and an ever-growing population that is
hungry for opportunity 165 that can only be found within major cities. 166 Highways and roads are
small, congested and often in need of improvements that require monetary commitments that
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Arab governments have been unwilling to make.167 Government officials are known to steer
clear of expensive, long-term, budget depleting projects and services because they constantly risk
the potential of being suspended as a result of budget constraints caused by revenue
fluctuations.168 Public transportation is lacking and is mostly limited to costly taxis or bus
systems, which are still constrained by road congestion that further complicates daily urban life
in the Arab world.169 Basic food staples, although often subsidized, are incredibly costly for most
Arabs (See Table 2 for data on food price volatility). The poorer segments of society, such as
farmers, often pay up to half of their income for food. 170 This makes life extremely difficult for
uneducated peasants. The imbalance creates a system in which the farmers cannot sustain
themselves or their families, thus they are forced to relocate to the urban areas. Migration issues
as a result of this place further strain on an already weak agricultural sector. Government
facilities are often underfunded and servicing far too many people. Schools, even in wealthier
Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, suffer from extensive amounts of overcrowding, with over 30
percent more students in classrooms than are typically permitted. 171 Poor urban planning
programs further complicate the ability to obtain primary education, as there are generally not
enough schools in the cities to sustain the growing population.
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The nature of these economies, their absence of economic diversity, and their reliance on
oil and rents from other resources, as well as extensive amounts of foreign aid, has a negative
impact on the employment sector (See Table 3 for oil export data).172 The Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) have the highest rates of unemployment around the globe, with total numbers
reaching up to around 12.2 percent. 173 Much of this is attributed to government policies that
focus on short-term regime interests rather than policies that take the long-term interests of the
citizenry into consideration. The problem now, however, is that a massive population bulge in
the Middle East has resulted in uneven growth, with over 50 percent of the population under the
age of 30. This is exceedingly problematic because a comparatively large portion of the
population is in need of jobs.
For example, in Tunisia unemployment had reached up to 18 percent, 174 with youth
unemployment at a staggering 26.7 percent.175 Excessive amounts of corruption on behalf of the
Tunisian government largely deterred foreign investment, thereby adding even further to the
economic complexities that the country was facing. 176 Egypt also experienced historically high
rates of unemployment prior to the uprisings that occurred. In Egypt, unemployment among the
youth was over 25 percent.177 This is problematic because almost half of the population in Egypt
is under the age of the thirty and nearly 35 percent of its youth were enrolled in tertiary education
prior to mass unrest. 178
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Although by no means homogenous, domestically speaking, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya
were indeed very similar in terms of development and state structure. These were all oppressive
authoritarian states that maintained political control through institutionalized coercion. Their
governments intimidated their citizenry into complying with the status quo rather than assessing
the needs and wants of society and delivering on those needs, as democratic governments often
do. These regimes were concerned with survival and little more. It is for these reasons that living
conditions within them were less than pleasant. Individuals who were fortunate enough to be
affiliated with those in power were given privileges that the rest of citizens were not. Inequality
was, therefore, particularly pronounced in these societies. There was an extreme disparity in
these countries’ populations. This applies to almost every aspect of life: social, economic and
political. These regimes remained in power through bribery, nepotism and brutality. This is why
Ben-Ali, Mubarak, Ghadaffi and other Arab dictators had to persistently trade public resources in
the form of money, land, jobs etc. to acquire the support of those who aided them in maintaining
the regime. These Arab states had high rates of unemployment/underemployment. They suffered
from instability due to regional and domestic safety concerns. There was a lack of social and
political freedom, large amounts of corruption, exceedingly high food and housing prices, and a
general lack of development.
The Arab citizens of today are far more cognizant of their inequalities than those living in
past decades with similar circumstances. They are living under the same oppressive regimes of
the past, however, they are now equipped with technology that enables them to rapidly access
and disseminate information. Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyan and Syrians are, therefore, more
informed about the surrounding world and more able to express their dissatisfaction with their
lack of freedom, with unemployment, lack of safety, housing prices, police brutality, corruption,
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inequality etc. These people perceive their conditions to be unfavorable because websites, blogs,
and social media posts illustrate the western world as comparatively better than their own
countries.
The uprisings that have taken place within these countries were no doubt attributed to
unfavorable domestic conditions paired with heightened social interaction (See Table 4 for
internet access data in the MENA). These people simply needed a catalyst for mobilization. That
catalyst was the Tunisian street vendor that set himself on fire to protest the corruption and
bureaucratic government barriers present within his country.179 Videos of protests that emerged
as a result of his suicide ignited the support and mobilization of others frustrated with the BenAli regime. The Ben-Ali government tried to prevent protests from further spreading by
restricting Internet access and shutting down dissident websites. However, the uprisings had
grown significantly and already spread throughout far too much of the country. 180Similar
uprisings began to emerge throughout Egypt. Many were surprised by these uprisings because of
the oppressive nature of the Mubarak regime and the strength and size of the state’s coercive
apparatus. Websites, tweets, blogs and texts through mobile phones and computers simplified
and amplified the distribution of anti-regime propaganda. 181Images, videos and word of the
uprisings taking place in Tunisia, rapidly spread among Egyptians, igniting disdain for what
were perceived to be similar conditions in Egypt.182 This revolutionary rhetoric spread
throughout much of the Middle East. However, some states like Libya and Syria became
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particularly susceptible because external forces had an interest in regime change. With that said,
they did indeed experience mass uprisings that were rooted in discontent that resulted from
extensive amounts of government oppression, unemployment/underemployment, lack of safety,
high housing prices and inequality etc.
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Chapter Three
The External Implications of Contemporary Arab Mobilization
Structural/ Systemic Foundations
Much of the contemporary mobilization in the Arab world can be traced to impediments
that stem from the nature in which nations interact on a global level. The philosophical basis of
the neo-liberal, capital-centric global economy has shaped nation-state relations in a way that
often emphasizes political domination and capital accumulation over basic human values and
principles. It is a system and philosophy that integrates elements of both physical and economic
domination through the use of global institutions. This overarching disregard for development
outside of a capitalist perspective has fashioned a system that is divisive and exceedingly
oppressive. It is founded on a culture that highlights new orientalist ideals; ideals that are largely
constructed on false assumptions about the Middle East and its people. 183 Neo-orientalism is a
false narrative that attempts to associate the ills of the MENA with the ethnic and cultural
attributes of the people of that region.
The imperialist strategies of the Western world enable it to maintain control of the global
system both politically and economically. This is possible because the institutional structure of
global trade is constructed in an oligopolistic way, so as to encourage the endless accumulation
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of power and capital among those in control and to prevent those in the periphery from
advancing. 184 Patents, strict trade regulations, and sanctions are just some of the barriers that
have been formed to prevent peripheral nations from branching out in industries. These barriers
often yield a greater profit margin, thereby preventing shifts to the structure of the global system.
Western powers use a mix of traditional colonial strategies of expansionism and neo-colonial
devices to maintain elements of the status quo, which are advantageous to the West and its allies.
This modern world system consists of various interrelated but dynamic components,
which are in a persistent state of interaction. 185 Much of this contact consists of the cross border
transfer of goods and labor, which is the foundation of the neo-liberal mentality that dominates
the current Western-centric political spectrum. 186Peripheral states such as those in the Arab
world are exploited economically and politically to bring about an environment which is unstable
and easily manipulated. Peripheral nations are often used either directly for their resources, or
indirectly to bring about specific political conditions that enable the global economic system to
continually exploit the MENA. 187 This results in a less noticeable form of domination, which is
often sold under the guise of altruist ideals such as democracy and human rights. 188
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Those who are part of the decision-making apparatus are often referred to as the “core” or
“center” as per the terms defined by Johan Galtung.189 These are advanced industrialized
capitalist states, which control the global economy. Core nations are generally rich with natural
resources and have strong state institutions with large, powerful militaries. These militaries are
used to uphold the regime’s assertive role in the global system. The core nations interests, which
are now mostly dictated by the United States, are centered around preventing any and all moves
toward pluralism. This is due to the fact that pluralism is perceived to hinder the political and
economic activities of the global powers in the MENA. Democracy is reserved for only those
who align with the neoliberal paradigm.190 The core nations’ goal, therefore, is to prevent
political efforts that reduce the economic and political wellbeing of the global powers that
financially benefit from the structure of the global system.
Imperialism is not a new concept for the inhabitants of the Middle East and North Africa
and this dissertation is not intended to downplay its existence prior to Western domination. The
MENA has experienced some form of imperial control throughout much of its history.191
Political control in the region, however, has shifted from a subtle domination to a more divisive
and exploitive kind. The mechanisms for controlling the region are significantly different as a
result of the ideological foundations of global hegemony. The semi-centralized nature of the
Ottoman authority allowed for a greater degree of autonomy among its populace, because it
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enabled most of the traditional tribal Arab systems to maintain their political relevance without
using too much coercion.192 Tribal differences within the empire were not used divisibly as they
have been by Western powers. Power fluctuated quite extensively during the Empire’s seven
hundred year reign, with some periods more politically centralized than others. What was unique
about it was that political authority made special provisions193 in terms of taxation and military
service in order to account for the unique nature of its more nomadic and tribal Arab populace.194
Politics in the Ottoman state were configured around an ideological perspective that was mostly
anti-accumulationist in nature. Economic policies were influenced greatly by the social
configuration, the relationship between state and society, and the needs of the different groups
represented throughout the empire. Ottoman policies were centered on maintaining the stability
and security of the entire empire.195
This is not to say that the Ottoman Empire was particularly beneficial for the Arab people. The
Arab populace lost its sovereignty and its ability to rely entirely on the tribal political elements,
which had been the fabric of its history. 196 The Ottoman Empire was imperialistic, after all. To
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say that any form of imperialism was good for the Arab people is to essentially say that
sovereignty is only desirable when yielding results that fit within specific ideological or
philosophical paradigms. Because of its nature, the Ottoman Empire brought about a polarized
environment, which in no doubt, was undesired by the tribal Arab population.197 The political
hierarchy within the Ottoman military, though not intentional, created divisions between the
predominantly Turkish military leaders and its Arab members. This was attributed to the vast
distinction in skills between the Turkish and Arab members of the Ottoman military. Illiteracy
and outdated combat techniques prevented Arabs from progressing as rapidly within the ranks of
the Ottoman military apparatus as their Turkish counterparts. Though this was later addressed, it
resulted in some cultural fragmentation between the Alayh (officers raised from the regiment)
and those who entered the military as officers. 198

Emergence of the Semi-Westphalian State
Arab politics transformed with the onset of Western Imperialism. European imperial
powers used the void that emerged with the fall of the Ottoman Empire to apportion the Middle
East and North Africa. They shaped the borders to represent the political and economic needs of
England and France, the two imperial powers, by implementing a semi-Westphalian nation-state
system.199 This was thought to be better than the tribal and sectarian rooted system, which was

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800," The Journal of Interdisciplinary
History 35, no. 2 (Autumn, 2004): 225-247.
197
Samir Amin, "U.S. Imperialism, Europe, and the Middle East," Monthly Review: An
Independent Socialist Magazine 56, no. 6 (11, 2004) 13.
198
Mesut Uyar, "Ottoman Arab Officers between Nationalism and Loyalty during the First
World War," War in History 20, no. 4 (2013) 528-529.
199
Raymond Hinnebusch, "Europe and the Middle East: From Imperialism to Liberal
Peace?" Review of European Studies 4, no. 3 (2012) 19.
!

!
!

64!

still largely in place after the fall of the Ottomans.200 The problem was that only certain elements
of the Westphalian state structure were adopted or implemented throughout the region. These
particular elements were those that benefited the European powers.
The semi-Westphalian system was responsible for introducing new geographical
borders.201 This essentially added to other elements, such as norms and values, of Western-based
cultural domination that were institutionally implemented throughout the Arab world. The
League of Nations Mandate System, which was the global institutional mechanism responsible
for the current nation-state structure of the region, geographically divided the MENA to
represent the respective authorities of imperial powers at the time: Britain and France.202 This
eventually resulted in the development of states that lacked the legitimacy to emerge independent
of external influence. It is largely responsible for much of the structural issues that contribute to
conflict within region. 203 For example, both Israel’s and Iraq’s conflict-ridden histories are the
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product of imperial missteps in the region. 204 Furthermore, Israel lost the support of its British
makers because of the heavy cost of maintaining it. Its unnatural borders, and its reliance on
emigration from other parts of the world to maintain its Jewish identity, were something even the
British realized would be costly.205 Iraq’s borders, again, courtesy of Britain, landlocked it from
the Caspian Sea and also cut it off from some of the valuable oil fields it had access to while
under Ottoman control.206 Those particular circumstances, and the waning influence of European
powers following WWII, enabled the United States to move in and reap the benefits of the new
geographical structure of the MENA. 207
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A Different Approach to Imperialism: U.S. Methods
The United States relies on an entirely different approach to imperial control, often
referred to as neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism. U.S imperialism is unique in that it generally
uses global institutions to exert its political and economic influence throughout the world. These
institutions serve as the mechanism for disseminating its neoliberal policies.208 The United
Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) serve as instruments for imposing economic and military objectives within the Arab
world.

209 210

These global institutions are used by the United States to essentially give the false

impression of multilateralism and to deflect some of the liability associated with policies, which
can be found as unfavorable by the global community.211 Because of its hegemony through
economic and military resources, the United States influences other major actors to back its
objectives by encouraging them politically to support sanctions and laws against states that reject
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the neoliberal paradigm.212 It also retracts funds from institutions that do not align with its own
political objectives. The most recent example is the withdrawal of funds from UNESCO for
voting in support of Palestinian membership.213

International law and sanctions
International law is applied rather disproportionately throughout the global system.214
States that align with the United States and its neoliberal paradigm are above the law. They often
evade conviction or even refuse to acknowledge the presence of criminal acts.215 U.S. allies such
as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt (under Mubarak and Al-Sisi) and other Persian Gulf states
persistently commit international crimes that elicit no reaction from the United Nations. 216
States that refuse or inhibit neoliberalism or other U.S. objectives in the region, in any way, are
besieged with sanctions and U.N. approved laws. These actions are intended to cripple the
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regimes.217 The United States essentially uses global institutions such as the U.N. to control the
economic environments in a way that advances the interests of its own elite. Targeted Sanctions
218

are used exclusively for this purpose. They permit the United States to single out and

economically crush regimes that are hostile or merely resistant to broader U.S. interests in the
region. 219 Evidence of this approach is illustrated in the cases of both Iraq and Iran. In both
circumstances the United States utilized U.N. Institutions to apply economic pressure to shift
policies within the regimes. 220
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Economic aid
The United States utilizes existing economic structures to advance its goals in the Middle
East and North Africa. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) are additional tools often used to enforce its agenda. 221 Regimes that agree to the
constraints of the neoliberal system are awarded grants and loans that sustain them.222 This is the
method that enabled Hosni Mubarak to remain in power for over thirty years(See Table 5 data on
loans and grants to countries in the MENA). Mubarak agreed to neoliberal reforms, specifically
the transitioning of the Egyptian economy via privatization, to gain access to IMF loans.223 These
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loans were used to maintain relations with Mubarak and to further U.S. and elites’ objectives,
specifically in regards to the protection of Israel. 224

Patron-client state relations: vehicles for neoliberalism
The United States maintains a series of relationships in the Middle East that enable it to
extend its influence beyond the capability of its military. Essentially, this is the role of
conservative Arab regimes. They not only supply oil and natural resources, which are essential to
maintaining the global economic system, but they also serve as allies and vehicles for a
neoliberal agenda, which the global system is founded upon.225 Their lack of economic diversity
makes them particularly prone to falling victim to this type of exploitative relationship with the
US. The problem for these Arab states, however, is that it becomes a cyclical relationship that
they are unable to disengage from. As discussed in previous chapters, the patron-client
relationship essentially discourages Arab regimes from diversifying economically and from
addressing the demands of their citizenery. These states, therefore, remain reliant on the
maintenance of such relationships for survival. The relationship also enables dictators that would
have otherwise been unable to gain popular support to remain in power.
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Preventing democracy
The United States often claims that intervention in the MENA is due to democratization
of the region. Policies in the region, however, indicate that democracy is not the objective. These
claims are merely rhetoric used to justify intervention that furthers the economic and political
objectives of neoliberal policies. Newly declassified documents indicate that the United States
began to gain footing in the MENA through covert political operations dating back to the
1950’s.226 Its first official intervention in the Middle East was intentionally kept under the radar
to maintain the positive, non-threatening image that most countries in the MENA once had of the
United States. It was completely different than the European approach to imperialism, which
relied on direct physical control through cultural domination. Its role in the region began when
the U.S. used clandestine operations to assist Britain in regaining its oil contracts with Iran,
which it had lost as a result of nationalization.227 U.S. intelligence orchestrated a coup in 1953 to
overthrow the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mussedgh who was
responsible for nationalizing British-controlled Iranian oil. The U.S. feared the further spread of
nationalist ideology throughout the MENA, so it strategically executed a coup rather than using
direct physical intervention, to prevent further anti-imperialist sentiments from emerging in Iran.
The United States viewed Mussadegh’s presence as a threat to the economic interests of the
global system because nationalist rhetoric was a danger to the extractive nature of Western

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
226
Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The CIA's TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran,"
Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 4 (2013): 4-24.; Sussman, The Myths of 'Democracy
Assistance': U.S. Political Intervention in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe, 15.; Ali Gheissari and
Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006).
227
Prior to the 1950’s, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, however, were mostly
responsible for imperialist policies in the region
!

!
!

72!

relations with the entire MENA.228 Furthermore, Britain’s presence in the southern portions of
Iran was necessary for deterring Soviets from expanding further throughout the country.229 The
U.S. government’s goal for the coup, though not entirely successful, was to return control of
Iran’s oil industry back to Britain by helping reinstate the Shah to power. Their aim was also to
prevent further spread of Soviet influence.230 The coup enabled the Shah to be reinstated.
However, public opposition to British oil contracts largely prevented the British from regaining
their monopoly over Iranian oil. The U.S. led coup was nonetheless successful in enabling the
British to regain 40 percent of Iran’s oil contracts through the construction of a consortium. This
was no doubt better than completely losing access to Iranian oil and was perceived as a win for
America’s first official act of intervention in the Middle East.
U.S. strategy in the Middle East, since its advent in the 1950’s, has been to secure its and
its allies vital political and economic interests. The MENA is the source of 50 percent of the
Earth’s petroleum and just over 40 percent of the Earth’s natural gas. Therefore, it is a vital asset
of the neoliberal agenda.231 Uninterrupted access to these resources requires constant
intervention. Because of its military strength, those countries belonging to the core nations,
though not always in agreement with the United States, allow it to take the lead in this process of
intervention. Essentially, this allows the United States, Canada, Europe and parts of Asia to have
unremitting access to the resources that are needed to sustain their economic role in the global
system. Intervention is designed to maintain the political and economic domination of the core in
the MENA. The process occurs through an amalgamation of political and economic policies,
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which consist of both covert and non-covert action used in unison to destabilize and prevent
development in the MENA. This level of control essentially allows the United States to shape the
region by strategically producing conflict and instability to achieve its own objectives. This
instability may not be inherent or indigenous to a specific regime in power. Direct military
intervention is far less common now because the United States has the ability to control these
regimes internally by applying sanctions. This intervention can cause the states to essentially
destabilize from the inside rather than through physical intervention from the outside. The global
system, the structure upon which neoliberalism operates, relies heavily on the manipulation of
events and circumstances to advance it agenda. As the global hegemon, the United States
intervenes in the region in an effort to control as much politically and economically as it can.
This is why the United States often encourages fragmentation and conflict rather than diplomacy.
Instability in the region allows for the U.S. war machine to profit from weapon sales and gain
access to oil for its allies, who rely on it to sustain the cycle of consumerism that neoliberalism
promotes around the globe.
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Chapter Four
Impact of the Arab Uprisings and The Future
Domestic Impact
The Arab uprisings have triggered changes in some of the internal political components
of the nations in which they occurred by awakening and reinvigorating segments of society that
were suppressed by the previous regimes. Though still fragile, civil society is growing and is
ushering in the emergence of new actors into the political sphere. These uprisings have brought
attention to the important role in which oppositional groups have in initiating political change in
the Arab world. Islamist groups, in particular, have taken center stage in the Arab spring because
of their grassroots approach to politics. 232 This approach has, in some cases, essentially enabled
them to become the voice through which the social and political demands of Arab people are
made. Islamists were able to increase their presence in the political sphere by shifting their ideals
to be more line with the greater Arab population.233 Additionally, their micro institutionalized
structure has enabled them to reach out to large segments of the Arab populous. The uprisings in
Tunisia and Egypt illustrate how dangerous these groups truly are to the status quo and the
longevity of conservative Western-backed regimes of the Arab world.
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Oppositional groups
The electoral victories of Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
illustrate the new political realities of the Arab world. Islamist groups are gaining support by
shifting their focus to social and political issues that concern the Arab people of today, thereby
gaining a relevant role in Arab politics that less institutionalized oppositional groups are not
afforded. 234Arab leaders will have to start taking Islamists more seriously because of their
capacity to garner support from the masses.
Radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS/ ISIL have gained appeal throughout
the Arab world because of their anti-Western, anti-imperialist stance. Groups such as these are
using the uprisings as a platform to illustrate the damaging effects of secular, Western capitalist
policies. They are attempting to sell Islam as the only viable way to combat the corrupt nature of
Arab politicians.235 The Salafists in Tunisia have even begun to compete against Enahdha236 by
staging protests and making death threats because of the secular approach that moderates are
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adopting to win the support of the populace. They want their brand of Islam to dominate, not a
moderate form that allows freedom. 237
Radical Islamist groups are constantly forcing these regimes to increase internal security
to prevent terrorist attacks. This is the case of ISIS/ISIL in Syria and Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia
and Yemen. Arab regimes are largely responsible for the radicalization of these groups because
their oppressive policies have marginalized large segments of the Arab people who have turned
to radical Islam for help.
These Uprisings, the attempt on behalf of the Arab people to instigate change, have
resulted in the emergence of non-state actors, especially Islamist groups in the political sphere.
These groups are divided into two basic categories, those that are moderate and willing to
institutionalize and those that are radical and unwilling to compromise. These groups have
distinct perspectives in terms of their role and the function of Islam within Arab politics.
Moderate Islamist groups have proven to be more pragmatic in the region. 238 These groups can
also be divided in terms of sectarian allegiances, further complicating politics in the region. 239
Radical Islamist groups have proven to be quite difficult to work with. Their existence has no
doubt been a challenge to all political forces in the region, as their insertion into politics has
forced states to reevaluate whom they negotiate with and how they negotiate. 240 The spread of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
237
A. I. Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist
Challenge from Tunis to Damascus (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013)122.
238
Moderate Islamist groups will have to be more pragmatic because they will risk losing
legitimacy and political influence through their institutional approach. Their capacity to
influence politics is based on their ability to garner the support of the populace.
239
“The Islamist elites will be challenged at home by forces to both the right and left of center.
Regionally, they will be pulled in opposite directions by Iran and Hezbollah, on one side, and
Saudi Arabia and the GCC, on the other”. Nabeel A. Khoury, "The Arab Cold War Revisited:
The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising," Middle East Policy 20, no. 2 (2013) 75.
240
Malley et al. explain that the emergence of Islamist groups, unfamiliarity with them
“gives the United States much less leverage. Washington has much less familiarity with the new
!

!
!

77!

radical Islamist ideals and their ability to recruit based on fundamentalist philosophies that
integrate Islam with anti-imperialist rhetoric has enabled these groups to become problematic in
terms of regaining stability in the region.
The youth have also become a legitimate oppositional force in the MENA because of
their size and capacity to mobilize. 241 The younger generation in the Arab world is exceedingly
disadvantaged as a result of economic conditions within their countries.242 Their lives and their
ability to marry and settle down, values which are very important in the MENA, have essentially
been stunted by their inability to find jobs, even with college degrees.243 Unemployment and
inflation, paired with corruption have largely kept the college educated youth from establishing
themselves in society. 244 Heightened awareness of the outside world, as a result of technology,
has allowed the Arab youth to access what exists outside of the authoritarian states where they
reside. The youth have become more aware of their conditions and this awareness has
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authoritarianism and state repression; and they were socially excluded by the limbo of
“waithood” or prolonged adolescence as marriage and entry into adulthood was delayed, in part
due to the high cost of marriage”. Diane Singerman, "Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the
Egyptian Uprising," JMEWS: Journal of Middle East Women's Studies 9, no. 3 (2013): 1-27.
244
Michael Rubin, "The Road to Tahrir Square," Commentary 131, no. 3 (03, 2011) 22.
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encouraged them to seek freedoms that have been largely absent in the Arab world.245 Because
of their ability to communicate rapidly via social media and text messaging, they have become a
powerful oppositional force. Though they often lack the cohesive structure that Islamists possess,
their ability to communicate with each other, combined with the free time they have due to their
lack of employment, makes them a large and powerful oppositional group.246

Elections and change
Sadly, to the dismay of those involved in mobilization, the uprisings have in most cases
not resulted in vast social, political, and economic change. This is perhaps because most of these
nations simply lack the political and fiscal autonomy necessary to invoke rapid and substantial
change from within.247 Elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya indicate a push toward the adoption
of pluralist processes that might have the capacity to bring about change. As these states are still
in flux, how influential elections will be in terms of representing the diverse needs of their
people is yet to be determined. Islamists essentially served as placeholders for the force behind
the interim governments that came to power, but were later replaced by more secular forms of
government. The Tunisian elections initially resulted in Islamists coming to power. However,
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245
“There were several master frames of the Egyptian uprising: One coalesced around justice
and demanded the fall of the regime, the end of corruption, and the prosecution of Mubarak and
his family. Another called for huriyya (freedom): freedom to vote, freedom to participate in free
and fair elections, freedom of the press, freedom to choose their own leaders, and freedom from
fear. For young people, this demand also meant personal freedom and voice”.
See Singerman, Youth, Gender, and Dignity in the Egyptian Uprising19
246
“ The predicament if youth in Egypt has been accentuated by increased education and
communication capabilities, on the one hand, countered by a lack of economic opportunity on
the other”.
See Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi, Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond107
247
Their dependence on the global system, and conditions in the MENA largely prevent
these nations from actually changing their political and economic structures in a way that could
better serve their people.
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since 2014, secular forces, specifically the party known as Nidda Tounis, have gained a majority
in the Tunisian state and are sharing power with Enahdha. 248 It is not certain as to what this new
secular government means in terms of freedom for the Tunisian people. Some claim that the new
secular president associated with Nidda Tounis may have ties to the Ben-Ali regime. If that is
indeed the case, then Tunisia may experience minimal change. In Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, the
Muslim Brotherhood president who came to power through democratic means in 2012, was
ousted249 from office and arrested within just a year. This was due to his outlawing of democratic
protests.250 Egypt’s current president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was not democratically elected. He
came to power by overthrowing Morsi, who coincidentally was responsible for elevating el-Sisi
to the role of the leader of the Egyptian armed forces. Libya’s approach to representation has
been a bit more successful. Its new constitution specifically banned members of the Ghaddafi
regime and those affiliated with the military from politics, thereby ensuring a cleansing of the
political system. 251 After the uprising, however, Libya has already experienced the resignation
of one democratically elected head of state. 252
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Dale Sprusansky, "Tunisia Makes Democratic Strides with Successful Elections," The
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 34, no. 1 (2015): 63.
249
Through a coup de tat
250
Tara Vassefi, "AN ARAB WINTER: THREATS TO THE RIGHT TO PROTEST IN
TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES, SUCH AS POST-ARAB SPRING EGYPT," American
University International Law Review 29, no. 5 (2014): 1097.
251
“…Law No. 4 of 2012 (Law No. 14 of 2012, which divided Libya into 13 electoral
constituencies, delineating districts and seats within them. Law No. 29 on the creation of
political parties provides equality for all (Article 7) but, at the same time, bars members of the
armed forces and the judiciary from being members of political parties (Article 6). Article 9 of
the same law speaks to the immediate Libyan context and bars all parties from having militias or
engaging in violent activity”.
See Larbi Sadiki, "Libya’s Arab Spring: The Long Road from Revolution to Democracy,"
International Studies 49, no. 3-4 (2012) 308.
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Giuma Ahmad Atigha replaced Mohammed Yousef el-Magariaf in May of 2013.
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Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have experienced elections but the legitimacy of these elections
are questionable as none of these states indicate a move towared democracy. Libya is now a
failed state and Syria has become more repressive because the uprisings have shifted into what is
now a civil war with heavy external influence. The uprisings have been successful (in the case of
Tunisia and Egypt and Libya) removing despotic leaders that discouraged the growth of civil
society. For this reason, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are beginning to experience the growth of civil
society groups, which is particularly important in the process of democratization., if that should
happen.253 The most visible problem, however, is that with the exception of Libya,254 these
governments have experienced very little internal change. 255 This is particularly true in the case
of Egypt where the institutional elements of the state are still heavily controlled by the same
elites that were in power during Mubarak’s reign.256
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Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer and Ziad Abu-Rish, The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings: End
of an Old Order? (London: Pluto Press, 2012) 31.
254
“Libya underwent a total regime change. There is little left of Qaddafi’s state. There isn’t
even much left of his family. The army has been completely replaced by the rebels, although
some of them are former army officers. Institutions and courts have to be built up from scratch
by people with hardly any experience in modern politics”.
See Michael J. Totten, David Schenker and Hussain Abdul-Hussain, "Arab Spring Or Islamist
Winter? Three Views," World Affairs 174, no. 5 (2012) 27.
255
“Despite free speech and newly organized political movements, the government is still in
the control of the old order, old elites, and a parlous economy that is threatened even further as
tourism has not revived”.
See Cannistraro, Arab Spring: A Partial Awakening41
256
“Subsequently, Libya and Tunisia instituted some transitional justice processes. Libya set
up an Integrity Committee to vet candidates for election and high office. Tunisia tried old-regime
security officers, whereas Egypt’s recently- appointed minister for transitional justice seeks to
limit his investigations to violations by Morsi’s regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus,
essential steps toward altering political and administrative systems were taken in Tunisia and
Libya, but not in Egypt, where the deep state remains entrenched”.
See Ann M. Lesch, "Troubled Political Transitions: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya," Middle East
Policy 21, no. 1 (2014)67.
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Libya is flooded with weapons that fuels tribal based militias’ fighting. 257 Due to this
ongoing instability, Libya’s oil exports have declined significantly, thereby worsening economic
conditions throughout the country.258 Economic conditions have not improved in any of these
nations, as they have all experienced huge declines in tourism and foreign investment.259 These
conditions will, however, likely improve if and when these governments stabilize. Whether the
uprisings have actually resulted in any of the internal alterations demanded by those involved
remains questionable. With the exception of the emergence of new political forces in to the
political sphere, major policy changes have been absent.

Regional Impact
Some of the anti-systemic ideals of the uprisings have spread throughout the region. Arab
leaders of neihgboring nations are becoming worried about the prospects of such events taking
place within their own states. This has essentially encouraged some Arab leaders to reconsider
their domestic policies in an attempt to prevent mass popular mobilization. Saudi Arabia has
resorted to bribing its populace through policies, strategically designed to alleviate some of its
financial pressures.260 King Abdullah of Jordan replaced his entire cabinet in an effort to appease
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Totten, Schenker and Abdul-Hussain, Arab Spring Or Islamist Winter? Three Views31
258
"Libya Economy: Quick View - Oil Exports on the Brink of Total Collapse." Economist
Intelligence Unit: Country ViewsWire2014.
259
“As early as February 2011, the occupancy rate in Cairo hotels declined to only 17
percent. Although the number of hotel nights in Egypt declined only slightly, from 136.4 million
in 2009-10 to 131.8 million in the FY 2011-12, the number of tourists from North America and
Europe declined sharply”.
See Winckler, The “Arab Spring”: Socioeconomic Aspects76
260
“ King Abdalah has tried to head off unrest in the kingdom with a series of economic
reforms valued at 135 billion Saudi rials (US$36 billion). The new initiatives, aimed at Saudi
citizens, include housing subsidies, unemployment benefits, and a program to give permanent
contracts to temporary government workers. State employees will receive 15 percent raises.”
Cannistraro, Arab Spring: A Partial Awakening42
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the Jordanian people.261 He also reformed laws pertaining to public gathering/protest and gave up
his right to appoint the prime minister and executive cabinet members.262 Uprisings in Algeria
resulted in constitutional reforms, increased access to national television and radio, and changes
to the electoral code to allow for the emergence of new political organizations. 263
It is no secret that leaders of surrounding Arab countries have been shaken by the
prospects of revolution. Most are attempting to prevent scenarios like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and
Syria by taking two fundamental steps; increasing the strength of the coercive apparatus, while
also making minor concessions to appease their citizenry. Bahrain’s government received
military assistance from Saudi Arabia to prevent what was close to, what some would say, a
revolution in the nation.264 The Algerian government increased pay for police and security
personal by 50 percent and increased military pay by 40 percent. The government also
introduced three-year back pay packages for those in working in security, to keep them firmly
committed to the regime. 265 Surrounding nations are, however, still experiencing protests due to
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Khoury, The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising78
262
“Jordan’s King Abdullah tried to defuse the protests by sacking his entire cabinet. The
new Prime Minister, Marouf Bakhit, promised economic and political reforms, but the firings—
Abdullah’s perennial response to domestic unrest — did little to dampen the protests.”
See Cannistraro, Arab Spring: A Partial Awakening42
263
Frédéric Volpi, "Algeria Versus the Arab Spring," Journal of Democracy 24, no. 3
(2013) 112.
264
“Saudi Arabia, sent about 1,500 soldiers and police officers to the island. Thus
reinforced, the monarchy launched a full-scale crackdown”.
See Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause III, "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang
On," Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012)81.
265
“The rank-and-file security personnel have benefited, too. In December 2010, the
government announced that the wages of most police forces—totaling 170,000 personnel—were
to increase by 50 percent and would include a three-year back-pay deal. Similarly, in December
2011 military personnel saw their salaries go up by 40 percent, also with a three-year back-pay
package.”
See Volpi, Algeria Versus the Arab Spring111
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unemployment, high food prices and general lack of freedom.266 Though not as strong and
organized as those in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria, they may still have the ability to evolve in
to larger movements, if conditions remain as they are.

The Sunni — Shi’a divide
The Arab uprisings have highlighted underlying Sectarian issues within Arab politics.
These divisions have been present since disputes emerged over the Prophet Muhammad’s
successor.267 Sunni Muslims follow the Sunna 268; they accept only the first four caliphs as
legitimate successors to Muhammad and leaders of the Muslim community. Shi’ites, however,
believe that Ali 269as the successor of Muhammad and that the caliphate was mostly a political
body created to control the people rather than carry out Muhammad’s teachings.270 These
ideologies deeply ingrained in the Muslim world have re-ignited disputes pertaining to leadership
in the Muslim world.
Mass anti-systemic movements in Syria and Bahrain in particular, have brought attention
to political realities associated with sectarian divisions in the broader MENA; sectarian political
issues that had been mostly concealed until the Iraq war. 271 Growing Shi’a influence a result of
the power vacuum that came with the Iraq war have led to fears of what some conservative Arab
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Jackson Diehl, "Lines in the Sand: Assad Plays the Sectarian Card," World Affairs 175,
no. 1 (2012) 12.
268
The Sunna are the teachings and traditions of Mohammed
269
The son in law of Mohammad
270
Heinz Halm, Shi'a Islam: From Religion to Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener
Publishers, 1997), 176.
271
“The US invasion of Iraq had the unintended consequence of reopening the Sunni– Shiite
conflict across the region. While Shiite and Sunni militias battled for Power in postwar Baghdad,
Iran in the Gulf States lined up on opposite sides”.
See Diehl, Lines in the Sand: Assad Plays the Sectarian Card13
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regimes refer to as the emergence of a powerful Iranian-backed “Shi’a crescent”. 272 This is
because the U.S. led war in Iraq destroyed the minority Sunni regime that had ruled for decades.
This resulted in the empowerment of Iraq’s majority Shi’a population, which subsequently
brought about aArab Shi’a government. It built a visible crescent shaped range of influence
reaching through Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.273
The uprisings have brought attention to how these sectarian differences influence the
treatment of minorities in these authoritarian states. In Bahrain, the majority Shi’a population is
led by a Sunni regime that aligns with Saudi Arabia. 274 The uprisings in Bahrain, though not
initially sectarian in nature, evolved into one as a result of the involvement of regional actors,
specifically Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned about the prospects of
a Shi’a political revival in Bahrain because of its proximity to the nation. Saudi Arabia’s fears
the influence of democracy and Shi’ites spreading into its own kingdom. Sectarian differences
that appear to lean more in the favor of Iran are incredibly troubling for the Saudi regime that
relies heavily on oppression, and Western support rather than legitimacy, for survival. Though
the Saudi regime has accused Iran of inciting protests in Bahrain, Iranian’s influence has been
mostly through religious involvement with the clerical establishment, rather than direct military
involvement. 275 The Saudi regime itself has worked diligently to suppress its own Shi’a
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“In December 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan famously warned of a Shi’a “crescent”
emerging in the region, connecting Hizbullah in Lebanon to the rising Shi’a power in Iraq and
the Islamic Republic of Iran.1 King Abdullah named Syria as part of this grouping, suggesting
the emergence of a continuous crescent”. Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Iran and Daesh: The Case of a
Reluctant Shi'a Power," Middle East Policy 22, no. 3 (2015) 45.
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Vali Nasr, "The Shia Revival," Military Review 87, no. 3 (2007) 9.
274
Simon Mabon, "The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian‐Saudi Rivalry," Middle East Policy 19,
no. 2 (2012) 89.
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“Although there is ambiguity as to the extent of Iranian involvement in the protests across
Bahrain, the veracity of ties between Bahraini Shi’a clerics and Tehran is obvious. Indeed,
Sheikh Isa Ahmad Qassem, the spiritual leader of the main opposition party, Wafaq, and the
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population, out of a fear for its own safety.276 This is why the Saudi regime found it necessary to
send military support to Bahrain and to focus specifically on dismantling protests in Shi’a
dominated communities in Bahrain. Conservative Arab regimes have also been actively
attempting to downplay the uprisings in Bahrain to prevent further Shi’a mobilization, through
the suppression of major Arab media outlets. Saudi Arabia and other news networks have
worked diligently to prevent not just the Shi’a population, but also the entire global community
from learning the true nature of their presence in the Bahrain.277
The conflict in Syria is similar in nature to that of Bahrain’s as it is largely founded on
sectarian distinctions and schismatic favoritism that is incorporated into the structure of the state.
278

Syria’s majority Sunni population is led by a Shi’ite, specifically an Alawite, Baathist regime

that is in ideological opposition to the conservative Arab regimes that dominate the Arab world.
Syria’s anti-imperialist, anti-Western stance is a result of the ideological underpinnings of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
leader of Friday prayers at a mosque in the predominantly [Shia]-populated Diraz City, “is a
religious representative of Khamenei, collecting taxes for the Supreme Leader, propagating his
religious authority, and encouraging people to follow him rather than other ‘sources of
emulation”.
See Simon Mabon, "The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian‐Saudi Rivalry," Middle East Policy 19,
no. 2 (2012) 89.
276
"Worrying Times; Shia Muslims in the Gulf." The Economist 396, no. 8701 (2010): 60.
277
“The under-reporting of Shiite protests in Bahrain is supported by televised interviews
with over four ex-Al-Jazeera employees who resigned as a protest against the biased coverage,
like Ghassan Bin Jadu and Hassan Shaaban”.
See A. K. Al-Rawi, "Sectarianism and the Arab Spring: Framing the Popular Protests in
Bahrain," Global Media and Communication 11, no. 1 (2015) 27.
278
As explained by Kojoori-Saatchi and Mehran Tamadonfar, Why Stalemate?: The Syrian
Conflict and the Sectarian Divide, 1. :“Alawite domination of the state has resulted in an unequal
distribution of power, which has therefore alienated various segments of the Syrian population.
This estrangement has led to several challenges to authority, specifically by the Sunni segments
of society, which account for nearly 58 percent of the state’s population Ideological
discrepancies and the treatment of non-Alawites by the regime has led to various forms of
resistance throughout the years. The Syrian government’s policies overwhelmingly favor the
Alawite minority and undoubtedly put the Sunni population at odds with the regime”. Ibid.
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socialist philosophies of the Baath party, and a broader pattern of Shi’a marginalization. 279 Like
Bahrain, Syria has become a playing field for regional and global powers to exert political
influence. The situation in Syria, however, is reversed because Iran rather than Saudi Arabia is
providing direct physical support to the regime through money, weapons, training and Shi’a
based military personnel, often directly associated and with the approval Iran’s supreme leader
Ali Khamenei. 280 Iran’s support for Syria is also attributed to its defense treaty signed in 2006
with Syria, which enabled it to get access to Syrian supply routes to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to
Palestinian factions that are devoted to Damascus. 281
The Syrian conflict has evolved into a much larger civil war because external actors,
regional and global. All of the parties involved see Syria as strategically important in terms of
carrying out their respective political agenda. 282 Though not publically admitting to it, Saudi
Arabia has and is continually funding Sunni Islamist groups that oppose the Assad regime. This
is particularly important for Saudi Arabia because like Iran, it would like to see more regimes
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“The regime perceives imperialism as its greatest threat and therefore focuses greatly on
anti-imperial rhetoric and policies that are centered on eradicating it from the region.
Furthermore, domestically the regime initially maintained much of the socialist guidelines
embraced by the Ba’ath party by challenging the bourgeoisie’s monopoly over the means of
production, especially through the mobilization of Ba’ath party peasants and workers. Ibid.
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Shahram Akbarzadeh explains that: “ In February 2014, Reuters reported that Syria was
receiving increased military assistance from Iran to boost the Assad regime’s capacity to collect
intelligence and train fresh recruits”.
See Akbarzadeh, Iran and Daesh: The Case of a Reluctant Shia Power, 44-54.
281
Imad Mansour, "Iran and Instability in the Middle East: How Preferences Influence the
Regional Order," International Journal 63, no. 4 (2008)949.
282
Nabeel Khoury explains that: “The Saudi and Iranian approaches to the Arab Uprisings
cannot broadly be labeled revolutionary or counterrevolutionary; instead, realpolitik
considerations carry the day. Thus, both states buttress friendly regimes that face protest
movements, but they also find themselves in the uncomfortable position of fanning opposition
when it threatens their adversaries”.
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throughout the region that are politically in line with its regional hegemony.283 The Syria
situation has caused Iraqi leaders to worry because the fall of Assad could mean that its own
majority Sunni provinces that border Syria could also fall victim to hardline Sunni Islamists. 284
For this reason, Shi’ite militias from Iraq and Lebanon, with military and financial support from
Iran, are assisting the Assad regime, though they may not fully align with Baathist ideals of the
regime itself.
The spillover of circumstances in Syria has forced neighboring Turkey to also involve
itself with the conflict, though to a much lesser extent than Iran and Saudi Arabia. Its initial
support for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) will likely be problematic though, if the Assad regime is
to survive. 285 As a majority Sunni Muslim country with strong ties to the West, however, its
stance in the conflict was no surprise. By hosting the FSA, Turkey essentially opened itself to the
regional complications associated with the power struggle between Shi’a dominated Arab
countries and Western backed conservative Arab regimes. It has also further complicated its ties
to Iran that were already shaky due to the regime’s decision to house early missile defense
shields for NATO. 286 Turkey’s role in the conflict, however, has been limited mostly because of
its desire to remain on moderately good terms with all the players in this regional and global
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283 Khoury states that: “In the end, for Saudi Arabia, as well as for Iran, the Arab Uprisings
are not about which ideology prevails, but rather about their own rivalry for regional supremacy.
Khoury, The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising77
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Diehl, Lines in the Sand: Assad Plays the Sectarian Card, 7.
285
“In October 2011, Turkey began hosting the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a militia composed
initially of deserters from Syria's armed forces. The Syrians have accused Turkey, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia - the last is especially disturbed by the Assad regime's close ties with Iran — of
providing the FSA financial support used to acquire weapons; while such is the case with the two
Arab Gulf states”.
See Bishku; Is it an Arab Spring Or Business as Usual? Recent Changes in the Arab World
in Historical Context6
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Yaşar Yakış, "Turkey After the Arab Spring: Policy Dilemmas," Middle East Policy 21,
no. 1 (2014) 105.
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chess game that is playing out in the MENA.

Global Impact
Mass migration/ refugees
Syrians specifically but others also in the MENA are fleeing their respective countries
because of poor economic circumstances and the dangers brought about by turmoil (See Table 7
for data on net migration flows). Economic conditions have significantly deteriorated in Egypt,
Bahrain, Syria and Libya thereby leading to an even higher rate of unemployment and of course
“brain drain”287; the loss of the more educated segments of society. If and when these conflicts
end, these countries will have trouble competing globally as most of the educated segments of
their populace will have emigrated elsewhere for better employment opportunities.288 These
countries will experience a lack medical professionals, scientists etc. that are not only needed
now but will be needed in the process of rebuilding, when and if that happens.
Instability in the MENA has instigated a worldwide refugee crisis that is beginning to
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Brain drain is “defined as the large-scale emigration of a group of intellectuals and
professionals with high qualifications and unique technical skills and knowledge. This
phenomenon results in significant socioeconomic consequences as a result of the continuous loss
of practitioners and trainees as well as losing their social value and financial support to their
country of origin. Many countries suffered from brain drain to variable extents particularly
during the second half of the 20th century, following World War II. In contrast, many countries
have markedly gained form this movement leading to remarkable development of their economy
and educational systems due to the significant contributions made by the immigrating
professionals to their respective fields”.
See Muhamad Arabi and Abdul Ghani Sankri Tarbichi, "The Metrics of Syrian Physicians
Brain Drain to the United States," http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3507067/
(accessed October, 2015).
288
“Major factors contribute to this trend on physicians’ immigration from Syria including
the large differences in incomes and standards of living, the scarcity and instability of
professional and academic opportunities, and the “culture of emigration” among physicians in
training. The majority of the recipient countries provide a proper professional atmosphere, better
academic freedom, and flexibility with much better overall living conditions”. Ibid.
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deepen global demographic and healthcare problems already present throughout the world. The
crisis has become exceedingly problematic for Syria’s neighboring countries Turkey, Lebanon
and Jordan that are hosting much of the Syrian refugees. The process of providing healthcare,
housing and basic amenities for the Syrian refugees, which are continually growing in numbers,
is not an easy task for host countries. Turkey is currently hosting 1.7 million Syrian refugees,
with over 200,000 in 22 camps throughout country. Lebanon is housing 1.2 million registered
refugees from Syria, and there are close to another 300 to 500,000 more that are not registered.
289

Though much of the funding for the camps is from outside sources; global institutions that

are mostly funded by the West,290 the monetary cost of sustaining these camps has proven to be
bigger than what these institutions are capable of handling. The United Nations, the largest
provider of aid is cutting food to Syrian refugees thereby complicating living conditions for those
who are already struggling as a result of displacement, forcing refugees to seek other forms of
income. 291 Because refuges are not legally permitted to work within their host countries, they
are forced to rely on the informal sector for wages; income, which is not only unstable but also
exceedingly low due to high competition. 292 This causes economic concerns for those belonging
to the lower socio-economic spectrums of society within host countries as they are now forced
compete with refugees for employment. 293
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Karen AbuZayd and others, "The Syrian Humanitarian Crisis: What is to be done?"
Middle East Policy 22, no. 2 (2015) 7.
290
"2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Turkey." UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html (accessed October, 2015).
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"Funding Shortfall Forces UN Agency to make Cuts in Food Aid to Syria Refugees."
United Nations News Centre,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51312#.Vhf36mCprlI (accessed October,
2015).
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Europe is also beginning to experience the impact of the unusually high flow of migrants
from the MENA. Some of the smaller Eastern European countries such as Hungary are taking
brutal initiatives to prevent migrants from staying. Their approach has, however, highlighted the
presence of a fusion of xenophobia and the very real fear of the monetary cost associated with
absorbing such large populations. 294
Though the short-term cost of hosting migrants in Europe will be costly for the European
nations that choose to host them; migration could have some long-term benefits for the social
democracies that rely heavily on taxes to maintain their systems. 295 Migrants from the MENA
will ultimately become a large base that will help offset the fiscal problems associated with
funding social services as a result of exceedingly low birthrates. 296 Migrants will, however, shift
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are rising steeply, pricing the local population out of the market. Substantial spikes in
unemployment, depressed wage rates and limited employment opportunities, mainly for lowskilled labour, are widespread. Despite the official restrictions on working, some refugees gain
employment and the surge in labour supply has deeply affected labour markets, increasing
market prices for basic commodities. While cash transfers/ vouchers to assist refugees have
enhanced their purchasing power it causes prices to rise in local markets, accentuating the
livelihood vulnerability of an increasingly large number of local households” Ibid.
294
"2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile - Northern, Western, Central and
Southern Europe." UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48dd76.html (accessed October,
2015).
295
One article highlights the European Union’s demographic issue and how this refugee
crisis can actually be benefit the long term interests of Europe: ”More than one-fifth of
Europeans will be 65 or older by 2025, placing great strain on social services and health care.
Integrating young migrants could provide a much-needed demographic boost. And unlike
Jordan, Turkey, or Lebanon, Europe has far more resources to integrate them. As reported by
CNBC, Pierre Moscovici, European commissioner for economic and financial affairs, has stated
that the current migration and refugee crisis should not just be seen in terms of cost, but
opportunity”. Keith Proctor, "Syria's Refugees are a Golden Opportunity for Europe," Fortune
Magazine, http://fortune.com/2015/09/15/syria-refugees-europe/ (accessed October 8, 2015).
296
“The labor income tax rate balances the government budget. The main driving force of the
model over the 21st century is the evolution of the population structure. In particular, aging will
put a strong pressure on pension systems that will be reflected by rising tax rates”.
See FRÉDÉRIC DOCQUIER and LUCA MARCHIORI, "The Impact of MENA-to-EU
Migration in the Context of Demographic Change," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance
11, no. 2 (2012) 262.
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the ethnic composition of these European countries and likely cause internal social and political
changes in the years to come; changes that may ultimately result in an alteration of policies not
just toward the MENA but also the entire global system.

Power Struggle, Proxy Wars and Terrorism
Conflicts and instability in Middle East and North Africa caused a power struggle to
emerge among the United States, Iran, Russia, and the U.S. backed conservative regimes that
essentially serve as a conduit for U.S. policies. All of these actors are interested in exploiting
conditions in the MENA to advance their objective. US policies in the region, its financial and
support for Bahrain and opposition groups in Syria are all designed to help sustain the strong
patron client relationship that it has with conservative Arab regimes financial and political
relationships that help bolster U.S. interests (See Table 7 for data on U.S. military aid to
countries in the MENA). The sale of U.S. military tankers to Bahrain, though an act that could be
perceived as contrary to the promotion of democracy, was intended to help secure the Sunni
regime from Shi’a opposition. 297 This decision by the Obama administration has helped
preserve U.S. military capabilities in the region, particularly the fifth fleet’s presence in the
waters of Bahrain, it is responsible for U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea,
Arabian Sea and East African coast all the way to Kenya. 298 Though the United States only
recently confirmed its role in the Syrian conflict, it had long been involved in arming anti-regime
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“…Bahrain's government provoked shock with its brutal response to peaceful protests, the
Obama Administration announced it would sell it armored vehicles for which the government
had, in the judgment of the Washington Post, "no plausible use other than against its own
people."
See Jamie O'Connell, "Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy in Arab States can
Benefit the West," Stanford Journal of International Law 48, no. 2 (2012) 344.
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Ayoob, The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance86
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oppositional groups299, some of who are now using U.S. weapons to achieve their own political
objectives.
Iran on the other hand, continues to fund and arm Syria, Hizbullah and other Shi’a
Islamist groups, though in secret, as it does to most of its allies, in order to maintain its influence
and political influence throughout the region. Iran retains military operations in Iraq, Syria and
Lebanon to strengthen ties with Shi’a Arabs and strategically protect its nuclear facilities from
military strikes by Israel. 300 Russia’s objective in supporting the Assad regime is tied to a series
of factors. One, its only international naval base is located in Tartus Syria and two, Iran’s attempt
to increase its influence throughout the MENA in an effort to become politically relevant after a
long period of U.S. global hegemony. 301
The Arab uprising has also caused significant setbacks for the global war on terror by
empowering and arming Islamist groups that seek to spread radical Islamism throughout the
region. Lawlessness from the uprisings has enabled Islamists imprisoned by the previous regimes
to escape and create Islamist controlled areas throughout segments of Syria, Iraq and Libya. The
disbursement of weapons throughout the MENA as a result of not just the uprising, but also the
presence of proxy wars has inadvertently enabled Islamist groups to obtain weapons that have
been used to forcibly gain control of villages throughout Iraq and Syria.302 Islamist groups like
ISIS/ISIL, are gaining ground and becoming a huge threat not just in the region but also around
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ISIS/ ISIL
300
Mohammed Ayoob explains that “Syria is Iran’s trump card in the Arab world; it acts as
a conduit to Hezbollah, augmenting Tehran’s potential for retaliation against Israeli and
American targets for attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, should such at- tacks take place”. Ibid.
301
Ayoob also explains” The fact that Russia’s sole military base outside the countries that
formed the former Soviet Union is located in Tartus, Syria, should not be underestimated,
especially since its psychological value to Moscow is greater than its strategic worth” Ibid.
302
Dale Sprusansky, "Understanding ISIS: Frequently Asked Questions," Washington
Report on Middle East Affairs 33, no. 7 (2014): 19.
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the world. 303 Their radical perspective of social and economic ills of Western imperial culture
has renewed anti-Western anti-secular paradigms. This is particularly true among the younger
segment of a society that desperately searches for a way to combat structural barriers, whether
real or imagined, in the MENA. This power vacuum and lack of authority has enabled new
groups such as the Islamic State to become a relevant, a very real and dangerous form of
opposition to all dominant political actors in the MENA.304

The prospects for structural transformation
Though not a global power, Iran is indeed making big strides at gaining influence
throughout the MENA. 305 Its control of much of the Shi’a Crescent proves that it is now a
legitimate force in the Middle East. Much of its ability to gain political relevance is credited to
mistakes the United States made in terms of invading Iraq, specifically its inability to control the
nation after the Saddam Hussein’s ouster. 306 That power vacuum enabled Iran to move in and
increase its sphere of influence. Because of these circumstances, Iran is now more powerful than
it was in the past. It’s power, namely in terms of its influence throughout the Shi’a crescent
through the use of proxy wars will likely be utilized to stabilize its economy and further its
nuclear ambitions, in an effort to become the regional hegemon. Sunni Arab states, particularly
those that are politically aligned with the United States, are all concerned with Iran’s nuclear
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Tara Vassefi and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, "Perceptions of the "Arab Spring" within the
Salafi-Jihadi Movement," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 12 (2012) 838.
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United States, Iran and Russia
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“Iran is not a marginal state like Libya or Syria, but neither is it a great power. It has few
friends and fewer allies.” Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Power in Context," Survival 51, no. 1 (2009)
181.
306
Iran “… has leveraged US mistakes in the last few years as its principal source of
influence in the region. Playing on regional frustrations and anger, Iran has positioned itself as a
spoiler and given rejectionism a new fillip in the Arab street”. Ibid.
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ambitions. A nuclear Iran will force neighboring regimes, previously unwilling to negotiate with
their Shi’a citizens to take their concerns more seriously and make concessions they may not
made the past.
Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab regimes are starting to see their power
diminish in the region as a result of the United States’ declining power and Iran’s growing
influence. These client states have been highly dependent on their ability to use coercion to
maintain pro U.S. policies in exchange for trade deals and aid that will benefit a small segment
of their population. These Arab regimes will have to address the social, political and economic
concerns of their citizenry or risk being overthrown. 307 Conservative Arab regimes will have to
decide between becoming more repressive to slightly extend the longevity of the regimes or to
begin making costly concessions in exchange for remaining in power. Their continuity will also
be tied to their short-term ability to play nice with Israel in order to prevent Iran from becoming
the regional hegemon; which appears to be happening. 308Either way, the future looks grim for
these client states that lack the legitimacy to maintain control without coercion.

Emergence of a more autonomous MENA
The growing presence of Islamist groups is forcing the United States and other Western
powers to reevaluate their role in the Middle East and to reconsider the value of maintaining a
significant political presence in the region. The U.S. will be forced to revaluate its policies in the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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These Arab regimes will have to consider the approach they use to remain in power,
particulary in regards to the rentier nature of their states.
308
“Saudi Arabia had agreed to allow access to its airspace for any military operation against
Iran’s nuclear program; this has not been denied by Israel and only half-heartedly by Riyadh”.
See Stephen Ellis and Andrew Futter, "Iranian Nuclear Aspirations and Strategic Balancing
in the Middle East," Middle East Policy 22, no. 2 (2015): 80-93.
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region because of its growing energy dependence on the region and the economic impact of an
intervention. The global community must prepare for a more autonomous Middle East with less
Western, specifically U.S. influence, because the United States will have to reconsider the cost of
intervening in the region, the financial costs, and if the American people are willing to continue
paying for this intervention.
Israel is clearly the state most affected by the uprisings because its existence as a state has
greatly depended on the U.S.’s ability to broker deals with its Arab neighbors. The continuity of
its hawkish policies has been contingent on two main factors: political fragmentation among its
Arab neighbors, and the presence of autocratic regimes that maintain patron client relations with
the U.S. 309 Israel will be forced to become more independent and choose a more diplomatic
route if the United States does indeed decide to reduce its presence in the MENA.
The fall of Mubarak may be the scariest outcome of the uprisings for Israel because much
of its border security was purchased from Mubarak. The U.S. government utilized aid as a tool
for buying Mubarak’s support. Egyptians believe that Mubarak traded the autonomy of his own
country to line his pockets with money from the U.S. government, his personal wealth and the
wealth of his family was no doubt due to his ability to play nice with the United States. With
Mubarak no longer in power and U.S. influence waning, Israel’s relations with Egypt will
certainly be called to question.310 The Peace treaty between Israel and Egypt that was reached
through the Camp David Accords in 1978 essentially provided Israel with the security it needed
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Morton and Shortt, The Arab Spring: Implications for Israeli Security70
310
Haim Bresheeth explains “This striking difference between the sentiments in Israel and
the rest of the world can only be explained by the many decades of instrumental colonialism, in
which colonial reality forms consciousness, and being/ action dictates thought. One is what one
does, after all, and it is impossible to continue to uphold liberal and progressive values if one is
involved with occupation, brutalities and injustice on a daily basis”. Bresheeth, The Arab
Spring: A View from Israel58 Haim Bresheeth, "The Arab Spring: A View from Israel," Middle
East Journal of Culture and Communication 5, no. 1 (2012): 42-57.
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to focus more of its resources on the West bank. With Mubarak gone, however, these peace
treaties may be at risk of being dismantled. In fact, surveys indicate that much of the Egyptian
community is opposed to treaties with Israel.311 Though not likely to occur; the potential of
losing Egyptian support is certainly troubling for the Jewish state.
The prospects of a nuclear Iran have been of exceeding concern for the Israeli state
because although political strategists know that the use of nuclear weapons by Iran is almost
impossible,312 just having them permits the Iranian state to gain far more influence in the region.
If Iran becomes a nuclear power, Israel will lose the nuclear monopoly, though not publically
declared, that it has in the MENA. 313 Though Iranian dialogue toward Israel is mostly political
rhetoric designed to gain the support of the greater Muslim population, it is loosely based on how
the Iranian government and the greater Iranian population feel about Israel and its bullying
throughout the region. A nuclear Iran will be less tolerant of Israel’s inability to play fair with its
neighbors. This is why Israel is now attempting to work with Sunni Arab states in effort to
protect itself from the prospects of a nuclear Iran. 314 The Israeli state, its borders, and its lack of
self-sufficiency essentially force the state to maintain an identity that is driven by fear and based
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“The popular revolt in Egypt that toppled Mubarak, however, has brought to the surface
public resentment over the Camp David Accords. A Pew poll taken shortly after the fall of
Mubarak revealed that a majority (54 percent) of Egyptians favored ending the treaty”. Morton
and Shortt, The Arab Spring: Implications for Israeli Security70
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Avner Cohen, "Israel's Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity and the Vision of Global Zero,"
Palestine - Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture 16, no. 3/4 (2010): 6.
313
Ellis and Futter argue that: “For Israel, a nuclear-capable Iran would be a highly
threatening strategic development. Its emergence would end the nuclear monopoly the Jewish
state has enjoyed in the Middle East for the past four decades. There is the calculation in
Jerusalem that such a development would significantly weaken Israel’s power and prestige”.
See Ellis and Futter, Iranian Nuclear Aspirations and Strategic Balancing in the Middle
East84
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“There have been indications of intelligence sharing be tween Israel and a number of
Sunni Arab countries regarding Iran and its nuclear program” Ibid.
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on preemptive force. 315 Its short-term goals will be to build alliances, secret ones of course, to
achieve its goals. It will eventually, however, be forced to engage in dialogue, unless of course it
decides to use its nuclear weapons, in which case, everything in the region, and the global system
will be changed for forever.
Israel may be forced to reconsider its policies toward Palestinians and eventually come to
an agreement in terms of defining its borders with Palestinians. Its expansionist policies will no
longer be sustainable if democracies should emerge around it, as Arab democracies will no doubt
favor the Palestinian cause. 316 With that said, the likelihood that Israel will actually consider
working with the Palestinians in the near future is slim. Its existence as a state is based on its
aggressive expansionism that is often driven by anger and fear from past events in Jewish
history.
It is important to note that Israel’s security and stability is also highly tied to its ability to
maintain its economy and extensive military apparatus. Its economy is reliant on petroleum and
natural gas, much of which is provided by Egypt or delivered by ways of Egypt.317 Without these
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Cohen, Israel's Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity and the Vision of Global Zero, 6.
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“Democratic governments in the Arab world will, by definition, be less reliable from the
Israeli-Zionist point of view, but they may, one hopes, be less corrupt, less pliable to pressure
from Israel and its western allies, less willing to serve its interests, and less willing to subdue the
Palestinians on Israel’s behalf”.
See Bresheeth, The Arab Spring: A View from Israel, 42-57.
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Morton and Shortt explain that: “Despite its modest population size, Israel’s advanced
economy and the sophistication of its people consume a disproportionate amount of energy,
ranking forty-eighth in the world in electricity consumption, fifty-second in oil consumption, and
sixty-ninth in natural gas consumption.18 While Israel has been able to establish self-sufficiency
in electricity, it remains dependent on the importation of large quantities of oil and natural gas.
Disruptions to the flow of oil or natural gas from abroad would constitute a grave threat to
Israel’s economy, political system, and state of military preparedness. Egypt supplies roughly 40
percent of Israel’s natural gas needs under a 2005 agreement authorized by the now-deposed
Mubarak government. Natural gas is supplied at a below-market price via an undersea pipeline
from the Egypt”.
See Morton and Shortt, The Arab Spring: Implications for Israeli Security47
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resources Israel simply does not have the capacity to survive as a state. The Israeli government
will have to learn to negotiate with whoever comes to power around it and accept the realities of
the policies it has pursued from the time of its inception. 318 Its energy usage may be difficult to
sustain if neighboring countries refuse cooperate with the state. This will be a difficult transition
for a state that has been almost entirely maintained through U.S. support. The state will have to
reconsider its energy usage and make an effort to be more self-sufficient in order protect itself
and its economy.

Global powers: United States, Russia and China
The United States will likely begin to see its influence slightly wane throughout the
region, it will attempt to maintain its client states the best that it can. It will have to step back and
reconsider the costs of its imperialist policies and if these costs outweigh the benefits; the loss of
American lives as a result of war and the psychological cost of being perceived in a negative
light. Europe on the other hand, will be busy working on plans to integrate the massive amounts
of migrants from that will continue to pour in from the MENA; issues that the United States
mostly avoids because of distance. Meanwhile, Russia and China will take advantage of U.S.
missteps in the Middle East and North Africa to achieve their own political and economic
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“Traditionally, Israel has had very lim- ited indigenous energy resources. In 2009, the country’s
total petroleum production was 4.03 thousand barrels per day (tbd); crude production, 0.10 tbd;
consumption, 235.00 tbd; net imports, 230.93 tbd; and proven reserves, 0.00. The figures for coal
are even worse: total production, 0.000 short tons; consumption, 13.935 million short tons; net
imports, 13.935 million short tons. The natural-gas sector is rela- tively better: total production,
55 billion cubic feet (bcf); consumption, 115 bcf; imports, 60 bcf; proven reserves, 1 trillion
cubic feet”.
See Gawdat Bhaghat. 2011. Israel's energy security: Regional implications. Middle East Policy
18 (3): 25-34.
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Recent surveys have indicated that less than 5% of the Arab world has a positive view of
Jewish people and this due to its treatment of the Palestinian people. Ibid.
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objectives. In summary, though the Middle East is in shambles, the United States, Europe and
Israel are also on the losing end. Policies will have to eventually be amended to encourage
democracy; not democracy for U.S. friends, but democracy for all.
Russia is making a come back by strategically positioning itself in the Syrian conflict. Its
long-term goal is to become a major player in the global system and to do that it must help its
allies in the region; those that rely on it for support.319 Russia views Assad as a better alternative
to what may come if he is overthrown; specifically if Islamists comes to power. Its objective,
therefore, is partially based on helping the Assad regime both militarily and financially in an
effort to prevent Islamists from gaining ground.320 This is a move that will set Russia on the path
to becoming globally relevant in the multipolar system that will likely emerge in the coming
years. Profits from weapons exports are not an important factor for helping the Assad regime; in
fact it renegotiated much of the Syria’s weapons contracts in favor of the Syrian state.321 For
Russia it is about building a presence in the region, not just to counter U.S. presence but also to
gain relevancy in global political arena. Its future political endeavors will likely mimic some of
the characteristics of old Soviet-U.S. rivalries, with Russia taking a more prominent role not just
from its support for Syria but also from its relations with Iran.
If this were a game based on which actor benefits most from the conditions in the global
system, China would be the indisputable winner. Its global image as a neutral, friendly business
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Matthew D. Crosston, "Cold War and Ayatollah Residues: Syria as a Chessboard for
Russia, Iran, and the United States," Strategic Studies Quarterly 8, no. 4 (2014)98.
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“Russia’s desire to maintain global diplomatic significance and ensure its place as a
legitimate international influence peddler. To that end, Syria is a tool to help facilitate those
endeavors. It is not about any special infatuation with Syria; rather, it is about Russia satisfying
its own global stage perceptions. This need for global recognition and legitimacy has a long and
documented history within the Russian diplomatic psyche” Ibid.
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partner will be particularly advantageous to it in the MENA because these states will be more apt
to trust its intentions. 322 China appears to be taking a different approach than Russia; it will
likely continue a neutral stance in an effort to sustain relations with both the United States and
the MENA; both of which are particularly important to its economic wellbeing. 323
China has essentially been able to utilize U.S policies in the region to its advantage,
especially in regards to its energy needs. U.S.-E.U. sanctions against Iran and other countries
have enabled it to offset U.S. economic influence while also securing oil and natural gas at below
market prices. 324 Its relationship with Iran is strong and it is unlikely that the United states will
be in a position to make an offer strong enough to encourage China to completely cut ties with
Iran. It is impossible, and all parties involved, China, Iran and the United States are aware of
that. Iran produces 3.7 million barrels of oil per day, has the world’s 3rd largest oil reserve and
2nd largest natural gas reserve. 325 Access to these a is enough to keep China interested in

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
322
“China enjoys a number of advantages over the United States (and other great powers
such as Great Britain, France, Germany, or Russia) in the Middle East. First, it lacks the
religious, colonial, and historical baggage that weighs down many other nations. By refusing to
get entangled in violence between Arabs and Israelis, China has demonstrated that it holds no
preference between Jews and Muslims. China has also avoided the quagmire of picking sides
between competing Muslim sects. Plus, geographic and demographic divisions in the Middle
East cannot be attributed to the Chinese”.
See Qian Xuming, "The One Belt One Road Strategy and China's Energy Policy in the
Middle East," http://www.mei.edu/content/map/“one-belt-one-road”-strategy-and-china’senergy-policy-middle-east
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The United States is particularly important to the Chinese economy because huge portions
of its manufactured goods are exported to the United States, its relations with the U.S. and the
MENA are therefore both critical its economic growth.
See Dorraj and English, China's Strategy for Energy Acquisition in the Middle East:
Potential for Conflict and Cooperation with the United States176
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“While the United States expended considerable political capital attempting to rally the
global community against countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Sudan, China stepped in to gain
access to their energy resources and to counterbalance U.S. influence, not only in these countries
but also in the larger developing world…” Ibid.
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maintaining good relations with Iran, but its ability to almost have exclusive buying rights to
these resources makes the deal even better for China.
China has also been able to benefit greatly from circumstances in Iraq because while the
US government has been largely occupied with trying to rebuild the nation as a result of the
nearly 10-year war, China has had the opportunity to move in and begin investing in the Iraqi
energy industry.326 Unlike the United States, the Chinese Government has been focused on a
more diplomatic approach to gaining influence around the globe. Its efforts are paying off, as it
has already begun the process of constructing a modern-day Silk Road that is founded on
strengthening ties between China, Central Asia, Russia, and parts of Europe. 327
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“The Silk Road Economic Belt—a series of land-based infrastructure projects including
roads, railways, and pipelines—focuses on strengthening links between China, Central Asia,
Russia, and Europe (particularly the Baltic). China will gain improved access to the Persian Gulf
and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia, and to the Indian Ocean through
Southeast Asia and South Asia. coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific region”.
See Xuming, The One Belt One Road Strategy and China's Energy Policy in the Middle East
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Conclusion
Citizens of the global community have begun to question the viability of policies
centered on capital accumulation and military domination. The Arab Spring may actually be the
catalyst that forces elites to reevaluate and alter the philosophical principles that encourage such
exploitative policies throughout the globe. The sustainability of neoliberalism has come under
question. Elites from around the globe will have to reconsider their approach to maintaining
control, if the neoliberal paradigm is even an approach that will be allowed to continue. These
uprisings illustrate the ills of Western intervention and the frustration and deprivation that Arabs
are experiencing. Arabs can no longer be fooled into thinking that intervention in the region by
the West is humanitarian or democratic by any means. These people are well aware that the
United States is capable of promoting democracy in the MENA if U.S. political elites really had
the desire to do so. Those who support the neoliberal paradigm have not had an interest in
promoting democratic ideals in the region. Instead, they have been interested in pursuing
objectives that are detrimental to the overall wellbeing of the Arab people. This is now more
visible to the Arab people than it has ever been.
Socio-economic disparity in these countries has become far more pronounced than it was
in the past. Power and wealth is concentrated among a rather small group of individuals and this
group is incessantly decreasing in size, which therefore causes further concentrations in wealth
and power. Neoliberalism, the philosophy that this approach is based on, is deteriorating the
world at a very rapid pace. This is becoming more visible to the masses because social
interaction has evolved to include communication between people that were largely unconnected
in the past. The global system is still in the beginning phases of learning and adapting to the
impact of this newly connected world that has emerged as a result of heightened social
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interaction via the Internet. Technology is changing not just the pace but also the medium in
which political information is transferred. This is no doubt a game changer for the elites in both
the Core and the Periphery. Political elites will have two choices. They will either have to
become more accountable for their actions and address the concerns of their citizenry, or they
will have to increase state mechanisms to maintain their population via oppression. Either way,
this will pose further challenges for leaders that lack legitimacy. Arab dictators will face more
obstacles in terms of maintaining control of their countries. It will not be as easy to stay in power,
as these new mediums for communication enable citizens to interact and rapidly discuss the
political issues that concern them on an entirely new level.
While the Arab uprisings may have not been as domestically transformational as those
participating in them intended for them to be, they will likely result in long-term changes for
both U.S. led policies in the region and more general global decision-making. So while these
uprisings did not necessarily results in the democratic, pluralist transformations that organizers
intended for them, they have indeed brought attention to the realities of the ills of the global
capitalist system. The Arab spring was not a single event. It was the start of a succession of
events that aimed to challenge the authority of those in power. This sequence of heterogeneous
events will continue to result in changes for years to come.
This dissertation illustrates that the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria can be
attribruted to a series of factors. Domestically, discontent is tied to the state’s inability to
consistently deliver on even some of the most basic needs of the citizenry, such as access to
employment and reasonable housing and food prices. Exceedingly high rates of unemployment
and underemployment leave the Arab youth, which consists of over 70% of the Arab population,
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with little hope for the future. Arabs also tend to lack basic social and politicial rights that they
so rightly deserve. Dysunctional institutions and high levels of corruption further complicate
circumstances as Arabs are left with no way to voice their concerns/demands to the state.
Because of these circumstances, Arab leaders utilize coocercion to maintain control of the
populace. Pervasive repression is used to prevent opposition to the political authority and its
policies, thereby creating an environment that is particulary hostile. This enviroment, to varying
degrees, was present in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria.
Externally, the structure and dynamics of the global system and the policies pursued by
the Western world often assist in the sustainance of autocratic regimes that lack the necessary
public support to remain in power through democratic means. Global institutions such as the
United Nations and Western financial institutions serve as mechanisms for carrying out the
intersts of Western elites. These institutions are used to apply unequal pressure to achieve the
overarching ideals of neoliberalism.In the case of Egypt, aid in the form of weapons and loans
have been used to stave off threats to the United States’ most vital ally in the region, Israel.
External support for Mubarak and his repressive policies were greatly responsible for Egypt’s
internal issues. In Libya, continued global sanctions on oil while Ghaddafi was in power, were
strategically used to reduce the economic benefit of maintaining the regime’s anti-western
stance. Also, the U.S. and NATO support for anti-Ghadaffi factions were indeed responsible for
the 2011 uprisings that led to the ouster and eventual demise of Ghaddafi and his regime. In the
case of Syria, the U.S. and Saudi support for anti-regime factions were used in an effort to
destabilize a regime that was steadily growing closer to Iran. IMF loans and grants to Tunisia
have been used to strategically encourage policies of privatization that further the broader
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interest of Western powers. Tunisia’s the West’s limited interested in Tunisia has ironically
helped more meaningful transformation of the post Ben-Ali regime.
This dissertation illustrates the complexities of studying the Arab world. There is not one
particular cause or source of mobilization. It would be a serious mistake to explain the nuances
of public mobilization by relying on singular factors. Methodologically speaking, one must
account for multiple factors that are shaped by the cultural determinants of societies in
explaining when, how, and why the public undertakes mobilization to dislodge unwanted
authoriatarain systems. In addition to internal factors, global interedependence makes Arab states
vulnerable to external forces that undermine public rights and their desire to control their destiny.
The current mobilization theories are too simplistic to offer a comprehensive explaination for
such a complex phenomenon as public mobilization. This dissertation is a first step towards
building a theoreatical framework that could capture the dynamics of public mobilization. Of
course, greater empirical work is needed to refine this framework in its cross cultural application.
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Appendix

Table 1
Perceived Levels of Corruption in the Public Sector, Selected Countries, 2010*

Egypt
Syria
Tunisia
Yemen

3.1 (ranked 98 out of 176 countries)
2.5 (ranked 127 out of 176 countries)
4.3 (ranked 59 out of 176 countries)
2.2 (ranked 146 out of 176 countries)

0-10 scale, with lower values indicating more perceived corruption.
Source: Transparency International (2011). Full citation. Transparency International, “2010
Results,” http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/results (accessed November 11, 2015).
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Table 2
Food Price Volatility
Country

Egypt
Libya
Syria
Tunisia

Year
2000

2005

2010

21.6
N/A
16.9
18.0

67.8
N/A
13.6
10.8

71.8
N/A
41.6
27.0

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States
Note: “This is the measure of variation of the Domestic Food Price Level Index It has
been computed as the Standard Deviation (SD) of the deviations from the trend over the
previous five years”. http://www.fao.org/data/en/
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Table 3
Oil and Gas Revenue as a Percentage of Total Government Revenue, Selected Countries
Country
Egypt
Libya
Yemen
Algeria
Saudia Arabia
Iraq

2005

2011

17
93
67
76
88
68

10
91
63
67
90
97

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, as cited in National Resource Governance Unit
(http://www.resourcegovernance.org/countries/middle-east-and-northafrica/iraq/overview)
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Table 4
Internet Users (per 100 in population), Selected Countries and Years
Country

Egypt
Libya
Yemen
Algeria
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Tunisia

Year
2000

2005

2011

0.64
0.18
0.08
0.49
2.21
0.18
2.75

12.75
3.92
1.05
5.84
12.7
5.65
9.65

25.6
14
14.9
14
47.5
22.5
39.1

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2015.
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Table 5
U.S. Aid to MENA
Country

Egypt
Libya
Yemen
Algeria
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Bahrain

Year
2005

2011

$1,790,549,933
$127,700
$29,218,116
$2,504,582
$1,366,684
$350,573
$12,417,525
$35,000,000

$1,529,204,296
$117,864,687
$133,813,587
$10,927,045
$1,600,289
$26,285,036
$35,326,842
$17,700,000

Source: usaid.gov
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Table 6
Total U.S. Assistance to Middle East 1971-2001 (loans and grants in millions)
Country

Economic

Millitary

Total

Israel
28,402.9
50,5050.7
78,908.6
Egypt
25,095.8
27607.0
52,702.8
Jordan
24,40.1
2,137.2
4,577.3
Lebanon
470.5
273.7
744.2
Palestinians
703.4
0.0
703.4
Syria
539.0
0.0
539.0
______________________________________________________________________
Source: "U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and
the FY2011 Request".
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Table 7
Net Migration Flows (thousands) for selected Countries, 2012*
Country

Migration amount

Egypt
Syria
Tunisia
Libya

-216,000
-1,500,000
-33,000
-233,000

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Table 6.13, 2015.
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Table 8
Summary of Case Studies
Country

Regime type

Internal issues

External factors

Tunisia

Authoritarian
Via Coup

Unemployment,
Underemployment
Corruption,
Security concerns,
high urban housing
& food prices

Egypt

Authoritarian
Assumed
control after
assassination
of Sadat

Libya

Authoritarian
via coup

Syria

Authoritarian
Via coup

Unemployment,
Underemployment
Corruption,
Security concerns,
high urban housing
and food prices
Corruption,
Internal and
security concerns,
clan based
divisions, political
repression
(Islamists)
Corruption,
Security concerns,
sectarian divisions,
urban housing and
food prices

Relations with
West, export of
oil,
Neoliberal
economic
reforms,
privatization
Relations with
West,(Neoliberal
economic
reforms,
privatization,
Israel
U.S./ NATO
intervention,
support for antiGaddafi forces

Conservative
Arab regimes and
West support anti
Assad rebels
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Economic
dependence
Oil exports
Foreign Aid/
Loans
Debt 52% of
GDP

Outcome

Foreign Aid
Suez Canal
Cotton
Oil
Debt 85% of
GDP
Oil exports
Debt 4.8% of
GDP

Mubarak
overthrown

Agriculture
Oil
Debt 58% of
GDP

No regime
change/Iran
& Russia

Ben Ali
overthrown

Gaddafi
overthrown
via outside
intervention
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